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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY TRAINING
AND
INDOCTRINATION TECHNIQUES

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PREFACE

The emergence of Communist China as a great power within the Communist bloc and in the world as a whole has been one of the most significant and serious developments of the past ten years. The Soviet Union itself has acclaimed the elevated status of China as a state in the "world socialist camp." In his keynote address to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February 1956, First Secretary Khrushchev assigned China a status above that of the "people's democracies" and second only to the Soviet Union.

In addition to China's acknowledged national status (as a state) in the world "socialist camp," the Communist Party of China has also achieved a position of stature, within the international Communist movement, in the field of strategy and tactics. The strategy and tactics used by CP China to gain state power have been endorsed by the CPSU and Cominform as a model for Communist Parties in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The strategy and tactics include the formation of a united front of all "anti-imperialist" groups under the leadership of the Communist Party, and the creation "wherever and whenever possible" of a strong army operating from a fixed territorial base.

On 8 January 1954 the Cominform Journal, reviewing the fourth volume of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works, accorded Mao prestige as an original strategist who "creatively and in a new way characterized it [the Chinese revolution] as a revolution of a special type now typical for revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries."

The extent to which CP China's strategy and tactics are applied by Communist Parties in the underdeveloped areas is specifically expected to vary according to: a) the "stage of the revolution" in which the Party finds itself; b) individual forms of struggle; and c) local conditions. However, there is ample evidence that Communist Parties in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are applying lessons in strategy and tactics learned from CP China's rise to power.

It is not only in the field of strategy and tactics that CP China is being copied. Since CP China is the most successful Communist Party of "the colonial and semi-colonial countries," many of its internal party practices have become the natural object of study and imitation by other Communist parties "in similar conditions." Recorded statements by leading CP China theoreticians on vital, internal party problems have become part of the arsenal of "organizational weapons" for Communist Parties in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Widespread use of Liu Shao-ch'i's How To Be a Good Communist is an example. The author discusses the importance of ideological training, the need for subordination of personal interests to those of the Party, the origin of erroneous ideologies, and the correct attitude toward what he calls "the intra-party struggle." An abridged version of this work, under the title, On the Training of a Communist Party Member, is included in section II of this collection. It has received special attention and study by Communist Parties outside of China. For example, applicants for membership in some Asian Communist parties are required to study this article.

In another work, On The Party, Liu discusses many of these same matters and, in addition, the need for discipline, the problem of cadres, rights and duties of party members, etc. Study of this work has been emphasized in the study program of at least one Communist Party in Asia. At least three Communist Parties in Africa and the Middle East are known to have studied Liu's works. In Latin America, one Party made a special effort to find funds for reprints of How To Be a Good Communist. Another Latin American Communist Party has given special attention to the portion of this pamphlet which describes examples and the origin of erroneous ideologies within the Party. In a third Party in Latin America, proposals for liberalizing entrance requirements were based on this work.

At the present time, many Communist Parties, particularly in Asia, are seeking to make themselves more acceptable to their national governments and have to this end soft-pedaled violence and open expression of their ultimate goals. Simultaneously, however, these Parties are tightening and strengthening indoctrination, training and discipline of their members, and every government needs to familiarize itself with the organizational techniques used by the Party in its territory.

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It is because the practices of the Communist Party of China in the sphere of indoctrination, training and discipline are being so largely stressed by many other Parties that this manual on CP China personnel practices and methods has been assembled. These are the techniques used by CP China to develop properly indoctrinated party members and to ensure their absolute unwavering allegiance and complete control of each member and the party organization to which he belongs.

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INTRODUCTION

The first selection in this compilation of materials on practices of the Communist Party of China (CCP) describes the Party's post-war approach to the problems of recruitment, training and internal reform. It is a revised version of an original study based largely on published CCP documents. In reading this selection, special attention should be given to the continuous process of "ideological remoulding" which is characteristic of CCP discipline, and to the various forms which this process takes at different stages of the party member's career.

The next selection presents the party Center's concept of the ideal party member as reflected in 1939 speeches by two of the CCP's leading theoreticians. This material is taken from the Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank. Ch'en Yün, the author of How To Be a Good Communist Party Member, is now a member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CCP, and is also a Vice-Premier specializing in economic affairs. Liu Shao-ch'i, who wrote On the Training of a Communist Party Member (which contains material included in his How To Be A Good Communist), is a member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CCP and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. He is usually listed as second only to Mao, and is the Party's leading theoretician. The chief significance of these articles is that they reaffirmed the Leninist foundations of the Party at a time when the propaganda line formulated for the anti-Japanese United Front created in some areas the impression that the CCP, in attending to the more immediate national peril, had compromised its ultimate Communist aims. The articles were emphasized during that period and after, through switches in the party line, during the civil war in China and the period of intense "cold war" with the West. They continue to be used as major indoctrination tools. The continuing use of these articles through these different periods illustrates the uncompromising nature of party disciplinary requirements. The central theme of both articles is the need for members "to subordinate their individual interests to those of the Party; to carry out party resolutions not only in the time of victory but also in the hour of defeat."

The final selection is concerned with the methods by which the Chinese Communists insure execution of their domestic policies through the use of "psychological control." It is taken from Richard Walker's China Under Communism: The First Five Years. After assuming power in 1949, the CCP found itself with a vast area to govern and few trained and disciplined people to administer the rigid and tough-minded policies they had adopted. For this reason it established a series of camps and schools in which were segregated and indoctrinated almost one million potential cadres per year for over three years. The selection, which is based primarily on party documents and personal interviews in Hong Kong with refugees who had actually attended these schools, describes the indoctrination principles followed and the actual training process. The techniques of coercion, beginning with physical control of the trainees, and proceeding through progressive stages of physical and mental fatigue, tension, uncertainty, study of Marxist-Leninist documents, etc., until an emotional crisis is reached, are described here in accurate detail. According to the testimony of these refugees, "the soul becomes public property" and ultimately the subject discards his "reactionary" past for an entirely new (Communist) set of values. Thorough inculcation of absolute loyalty to the Party, and of absolute acceptance of party discipline, was placed ahead of any training in the practical arts of government administration. Specifically designed to speedily indoctrinate large numbers of cadres during a period of tremendous party expansion and increase of responsibility, some features of the program may since have been given less emphasis, but it may be safely assumed that the various techniques are still a part of party indoctrination methods. It is known that the searching self- and group-criticisms, and the unyielding emphasis on orthodoxy and party discipline, continue to animate party practice.

I. Chinese Communist Party Personnel Policies

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a. General and Special Features -- Like other Communist parties, the CCP is a centralized and monolithic organization in which powers of policy decision and appointment are concentrated in a small group of top party leaders. Authority is transmitted downward through a pyramid of command to the smallest units of urban and rural control. The danger of individual aberrations is effectively minimized by the vesting of authority at each level in party committees rather than in individual leaders, and by the maintenance of an elaborate system of checks and controls over party members. The members of the CCP are carefully selected and trained, are firmly disciplined, and are expected to live up to a very high code of personal conduct. They are required to subordinate all personal ambitions to the interests of the party and to make all sacrifices necessary for the furtherance of the party's revolutionary program.

Like other Communist Parties, the CCP possesses a strong sense of mission and destiny. Party members are imbued with a conviction that they are taking part in a great historical movement of worldwide significance, the ultimate triumph of which is inevitable. This conviction has inspired the average party member with a fanatical zeal and has provided psychological compensations that offset the lack of material rewards.

Another trait which the CCP has in common with other Communist parties is the conspiratorial and semicovert nature of its operations. In the period before 1949, much of the CCP apparatus was underground, and the greatest secrecy was maintained regarding party membership and operations. Local party organizations were established vertically, with no direct contact between them. Information was carefully compartmentalized so that each party member was knowledgeable of party matters only within his own narrow sphere of operations. Following the Communist seizure of the China mainland, the CCP organization operated in a much more overt manner. Nevertheless, party plans and operations have remained shrouded in secrecy, and the identity of individual party members still is often concealed from the local populace.

Besides these characteristics, common to Communist parties in general, the CCP has certain unique features in connection with its rise to power, party membership, and relative lack of purges.

The significant factors with respect to the CCP's rise to power are: (1) its long and bitter military struggle against great odds, during which it was able to build up a professional army under its close control; (2) the establishment of territorial bases of resistance in rural areas during the 1930's, after earlier attempts to gain power in the cities had failed; and (3) the utilization of a strategy devised by Mao Tse-tung, which adapted Leninist principles to an indigenous Chinese scene and offered proof that an armed revolution based on peasant support, and divorced from urban areas, could succeed.

b. Size and Social Composition of the Party -- Speaking as the official head of the Chinese delegation to the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956), Chu Teh, Politburo member and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Government, announced that the CCP has over 9,000,000 members. This would make it the largest Communist Party in the world, as the membership of the Soviet Communist Party, as announced at its 20th Party Congress, is just over 7,200,000.

The Party has experienced a tremendous expansion between 1945 and 1956. The present party membership is seven and one-half times the 1945 membership, an increase of almost eight million members in eleven years. Because of this expansion, the rank and file membership is composed largely of relative newcomers. Less than 20% have over 10 years service in the party. Assimilation of these millions of new members into the party has posed many problems for the party leadership. Many new members were poorly educated and many more politically unreliable. The task of weeding out the politically undesirable and of training and indoctrinating the remainder of the recruits has been given constant and recurring attention by the party since 1951, when a three-year program of party consolidation and reform was begun, and has continued through 1956, when party organs were included among the groups into which counterrevolutionaries are alleged to have found their way. (See below, under Party Personnel.)

Another striking feature of the CCP is the high percentage of women and youth. As of June 1951, about one tenth of the membership was female and about one of every six was under 25.

In true orthodox fashion, the CCP claims to be the "organized vanguard of the working class," but most of its membership is derived from rural origins. As of 1948, over 90% of the rank and file membership consisted of persons recruited in rural areas. Even as late as July 1951, two years after taking over urban areas, almost 80% of the total were persons with peasant backgrounds, and the percentage has not dropped below 75%. Of the 1,300,000 non-rural members at that time, about 1,100,000 were classed as intellectuals, and a mere 200,000 officially classified as urban industrial workers.

Because of the conflict between the facts of the China situation with the classical Leninist standards for a party of the urban proletariat, Chinese Communist theoreticians have resorted to many devious rationalizations to reconcile theory with reality. One expedient has been to describe the peasants as members of the "rural proletariat." Another has been to discount social factors and emphasize ideological and organizational factors. Thus party leader Liu Shao-ch'i argued that:

"The social origins of party membership are not all-important. The true determining factors are our party's political struggles and its political and ideological leadership. Our party's program will guarantee the predominance of the proletarian outlook." (On the Party, 1945.)

For the past five years, party leaders have given increasing attention to building the urban-worker component of the party base. Plans announced in July 1950 envisioned the gradual recruitment over a three year period of one-third of China's urban workers (estimated by Communist statisticians as comprising 3,000,000 persons). During 1952 and 1953 there was some recruiting of skilled workers in urban areas, and official statistics of April 1953 stated that 450,000 trade union members were enrolled as members of the CP. By 1955, however, recruitment in the countryside--necessary to ensure success of vital agricultural programs--was being stressed.

c. Party Personnel

(1) General -- The personnel policies of the CCP have been governed by the particular needs of the party during various phases of its development. During the period from the early 1930's to 1948, the party was composed of a comparatively small group of revolutionaries who were engaged in almost constant military struggle for survival in isolated rural areas. In this situation there was little need for technical or administrative skills, and the primary requisites of a good party man were military ability and political reliability.

Following the party's rapid military victories in the period 1948-1949, the picture changed. Overnight, the party's territorial base was vastly enlarged, and embraced most of China proper. The party was compelled to move from the rural areas into the large cities, where it was confronted with new and complex administrative responsibilities. In this new situation the party's limited supply of administrative and technical personnel was severely taxed. Not only was the party elite too small to consolidate political control, but the older type of party member, with his limited horizons, was unsuited to the new challenge. Recruits with greater education and technical competence were needed.

The party thus began a rapid expansion of its ranks, taking in large numbers of students and educated persons who, though less reliable politically, had useful talents to offer. The rapid growth of the party during the period 1948-50 necessarily involved some lowering of admission standards and some dilution of the party ranks with persons of dubious political backgrounds. Moreover, the task of trying to assimilate and indoctrinate the millions of new recruits was one which severely strained the party's existing training facilities.

The rapid victories of the CCP in 1948 and 1949 and its shift of operations to the urban areas also created new problems of maintaining party zeal and *esprit de corps*. The end of military operations and exposure to the unfamiliar comforts and luxuries of urban life produced, among many of the older party members, a tendency to relax and enjoy life and to lose sight of revolutionary goals. At the same time, the growing involvement of the party machine in the routine business of running a vast governmental apparatus created a very real danger that the party would soon become hopelessly bogged down in bureaucratic red tape and would lose its revolutionary momentum.

Since 1948 the party leadership has become increasingly aware of the magnitude of the personnel problems confronting it--an awareness revealed in speeches of party leaders, in directives issued by the party Central Committee, and in the convening of party conferences on organizational

problems. As the party leaders doubtless realize, the strength and effectiveness of the party organization as a whole is dependent to a very large degree on the loyalty and performance of the rank-and-file party members, who are known as "cadres" or kan-pu.

Party Secretary Liu Shao-ch'i, speaking at the Seventh Party Congress (1945), declared that:

The problem of cadres is a problem of vital importance . . . the cadres of the party are the nucleus of the party's leadership in the Chinese Revolution. . . . The problem of cadres is virtually an all-decisive issue in the cause of the Chinese people. . . .

The term "cadre" as used by the Chinese Communist has both a generic and a more specific meaning. Used generically, it can refer to all party members, including those in the army and in government. Used more specifically, it may apply only to those party members who have definite responsibilities for some particular type of party activity, such as propaganda or organizational work. In general, the word "cadre" connotes political reliability, responsibility, and leadership. However, all cadres are not necessarily party members; both the account in section III of this study and the Chinese Communist press refer to persons assigned jobs as government employees who are described as cadres. Many of these cadres, however, are not party members.

Party members are divided into two major groups: the full or regular members, who enjoy all rights and privileges of membership (including the right to vote in party elections and to be elected to office), and the probational or "candidate" members, who have a voice in party councils, but no vote. Another important distinction is the fact that regular members have access to confidential documents, whereas the probational members do not.

In addition to these two broad categories, there appears to be a further classification of cadres according to party rank, and type of work assignment, although little information on this subject is available. Official Communist broadcasts have referred to such groups as "leadership cadres," "lower-level cadres," and "backbone cadres" (ku-kan fen-tzu). The "backbone cadres" are party members who provide "stiffening" within nonparty organizations, such as peasant associations and labor unions.

Party cadres are described as the "nucleus of leadership among the masses." They provide a vital link between the party organization and the various parts of the state apparatus, and between the party and government superstructure and the general populace. Party members scattered throughout the army, government, and mass organizations transmit party policy and directives and oversee their execution. Party members in the villages and city streets maintain liaison between the party and the people by publicizing and explaining party policy and gathering information on popular reactions to party programs.

Because of their position as connecting links between the party organization and other sectors of the society, the party cadres play a very vital role in party operations. They often constitute the strength or weakness of the party chain of command. The ability of the party leadership to have its orders effectively carried out depends on the ability of the local cadre to interpret them correctly and to explain them to others. Similarly, the ability of the party leadership to gauge the effectiveness and wisdom of its policies and to plan future programs depends to a large extent on its receiving honest and accurate reports from the field.

(2) Party Recruiting -- CCP leaders have repeatedly emphasized the importance of "party-building," which they view not as an isolated process but rather as a process which must be closely integrated with all aspects of the party's work. Two basic considerations underlie party recruiting activity--quantity and quality. On the one hand there is the desire to maintain party membership at a size adequate to meet current operational needs; on the other there is the need to safeguard the "purity" of the party ranks by screening out all persons of dubious political reliability. To some extent, considerations of quantitative increase have at times taken precedence over considerations of quality; in general, however, the party has sought to reconcile the two, although not entirely successfully.

Because the party regards itself as an elite group, it has sought to restrict its membership to persons who meet certain definite requirements and standards. The party constitution of 1945 stipulated that:

Any person may become a member of the party who accepts the program and constitution of the party, belongs to and works in one of the party's organizations, observes party discipline, and pays party dues.

The party constitution also specifies certain duties a party member is expected to perform, as follows: 1) understanding the "fundamentals of Marxist-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung"; 2) observing party discipline strictly; 3) participating actively in inner-party political life and in the revolutionary movement; 4) carrying out the policies and directives of the party; 5) fighting against everything inside and outside the party which is detrimental to the party's interests; 6) strengthening the party's relations with the masses by explaining party policy to them and reporting their demands to the party leadership; and 7) mastering a line of work and performing assigned tasks in an exemplary fashion.

Party recruitment policy since 1948 has shown two dominant trends: 1) a gradual tightening up of recruitment through the adoption of more stringent admission requirements; and 2) an increased emphasis on recruiting targets in urban industrial areas, and the gradual imposition of a restriction on recruiting in the rural areas. This restriction was lifted immediately following the announcement of the general line for transition to socialism (September 1953); the purpose being to establish party control over agricultural producer cooperatives.

During the period 1948 to 1950, when the dominant consideration was to effect a rapid increase in the size of party membership, admission standards were relaxed and a number of students and intellectuals of dubious "bourgeois" backgrounds were admitted to the party. From the middle of 1950 onward there was increasing concern among the party leadership that the relaxation of admission standards had created a threat to the "purity" of the party. Moreover, beginning in March 1949, when the Second Plenum of the Central Committee resolved to transfer the base of party operations to the large cities, there was a growing preoccupation with the need to emphasize the recruitment of urban factory workers and thereby to strengthen the influence of the party in urban areas.

One of the major landmarks in party recruiting policy was the address of Mao Tse-tung to the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, in June 1950. This speech heralded a tightening of recruitment in general and a greater attention to the recruitment of urban workers. In this address Mao stated:

We must now adopt a policy of more careful expansion. . . . Opportunists must be resolutely expelled . . . and attention must be paid to expanding the proportion of workers in the party. In the old liberated areas, the enrollment of party members from villages must be stopped. . . . In the newly liberated areas, the party organization should, in general, not be expanded in the villages. . . .

The resolutions passed by the Third Plenum called for a restriction on the recruiting of peasants and indicated that the party would attempt to absorb, by degrees, about one-third of China's 3,000,000 industrial workers over a three-year period. The figure of 3,000,000 industrial workers is the standard figure now used by Communist statisticians. While the Communists have never broken it down into specific components, it is believed to include not only factory workers (who number about 1,000,000 or slightly more) but also workers in mining enterprises, railways, and other forms of modern communications.

The basic policy line on recruiting established by the Third Plenum of the Central Committee was not actually implemented until many months later. One major step in this direction was the convening of a National Conference on Party Organization, which met in Peiping during March and April 1951. Although this conference was never discussed in detail in the Communist press, it is believed to have adopted new and more stringent requirements for party membership and also to have launched a three-year program of party reform aimed at raising standards of performance and purging "undesirable elements" from the party ranks. At the same conference a decision was reportedly made to recruit 1,000,000 factory workers and 500,000 handicraft workers into the party by the end of 1953, while at the same time restricting the recruitment of peasants through a fairly rigid quota system that would admit only 10 persons per township (hsiang) to party membership over a two-year period.

One of the most important pronouncements on party recruiting policy was an article by the deputy chief of the Organization Department, An Tzu-wen, published in the Cominform Bulletin for July 25, 1952. An stressed the need for raising standards for party membership, stating that:

In the future, the members we accept must be the elite of the workers and laboring classes. . . . The admission of new members must be viewed as the result of a long-term process of screening. . . . Recruiting must be coordinated with other party programs, for it is only in the course of mass struggles that we can spot and screen activists of pure ideological outlook.

In the same article, An set forth eight criteria for assessing the performance of party members. The criteria reformulated membership standards previously adopted, emphasizing the qualities necessary to improve the members' performance and outlook.

Party recruiting activity since the end of 1951 has been closely integrated with and shaped by two important developments on the domestic scene. The first of these, chronologically, was a nationwide reform campaign known as the "Three Anti Movement" (san-fan yün-t'ung), which was aimed at eradicating corruption, waste, and inefficiency in government. During this campaign, which reached its height in the spring of 1952, sizable numbers of party members holding jobs in government were expelled from the party, creating gaps which had to be filled through recruitment of new members from the ranks of "activists" (pro-Communist sympathizers in the various mass organizations).

A second major development having implications for party recruiting policy was the announcement, in August 1952, that China had completed the first stage of "economic rehabilitation" and would soon embark upon a new phase of "basic national construction," involving national economic planning, the building up of a modern industrial plant, and the gradual collectivization of agricultural production, through the expansion of such pro-collective forms of rural organization as the mutual aid team and cooperative. Party directives during the latter half of 1952 called for special emphasis on the recruitment of industrial workers having a high degree of technical skill, and urged that all members admitted to the party must be people capable of mastering industrial techniques, directing cooperatives and mutual aid teams, or assuming administrative responsibilities in government.

Complete data on the actual rate of recruiting since July 1952 is not available. Membership was officially 5,800,000 at that time, and 100,000 recruits are believed to have been recruited during the following six months. During that period recruiting was largely confined to the large urban areas of North, Northeast, East and Central-South China. The majority of new 1952 recruits were drawn from the urban worker class. By 1955, with membership at 6,800,000, there was a renewed effort at recruiting in rural areas and among handicraft and small shop workers.

(3) Recruitment Procedures -- Primary responsibility for supervising and directing the recruitment of new party members rests with the party's organization departments at all levels and with the party committees which direct their operations. The actual operational unit which directly handles recruitment of new members is usually the local party branch (chih-pu) or a special group of organizers selected by the local party committee. Individual members of the party branch and of the organization teams are expected to be on the watch for promising material among local people, especially among such people as model laborers, model peasants, members of the youth league, active members of peasant associations and labor unions, and all persons who demonstrate special zeal in supporting party programs. Each party member is expected to befriend one or two such "active elements" in his place of work and to give him some basic instruction on the party's organization and program. Local party cadres submit lists of promising activists to their branch committee, which then forwards the list to the next higher level committee for review and approval (in rural areas, this would normally be the hsien committee). Each party committee is expected to build up a reservoir of such promising "activists," who can be drawn upon when needed.

Since 1952 the party has been attempting to regularize its recruitment machinery, particularly in urban areas. Directives issued by the Central-South China Bureau and East China Bureau in 1952 stipulated that all recruitment drives would be preceded by propaganda campaigns designed to publicize party aims and objectives. At a special conference on organization in East China in June 1952, it was decided that party committees in all major cities should appoint organization officers on both a permanent and a temporary basis to direct recruiting in factories, mines, schools, and civic organizations. Permanent organizers would be selected from the organization departments of the municipal party committees; temporary officers would be drawn from party members holding responsible jobs in labor unions and other mass organizations. In large factories, one organizer would be assigned for every 1,000 workers. In addition to the individual organizers

assigned to special units, there would also be special teams, known as "party building work teams," under the direction of the ward committees of the CCP, which would handle recruitment among the general population.

Party recruiting in Peiping has been carried out by a group of 500 or more organizers, who are selected from cell leaders and from more experienced party members. These organizers are under the direction of the Organization Department of the Municipal Party Committee, which draws up plans and coordinates efforts. The organizers are responsible for locating promising candidates and for conducting preliminary interviews concerning their backgrounds and motives for joining the party.

The actual process of recruitment and screening, as described in the constitution, is a highly elaborate one, consisting of several stages. First, the applicant for party membership must find two regular members of the party to sponsor him for membership. These must be men who know the applicant well and who can testify to the party cell on his character and past performance. If the applicant comes from a "suspect" social background, such as a landlord family, or if he transfers to the CCP from a noncommunist political group, one of his sponsors must have had more than three years of party service. The applicant's sponsors report on the applicant to their party cell, noting his strengths and weaknesses. A formal application for admission, filled out by the applicant and bearing the signatures and testimony of each of his sponsors, is then submitted to the party cell as a whole for discussion, and comments representing the joint views of cell members are added.

When the cell has acted on the application, it forwards it with its comments and those of the original sponsors to the party branch committee which discusses it in detail and adds its own comments to those of the cell. The usual procedure is then to bring the application before a general meeting of the party branch, which votes its approval or disapproval, after hearing a report by the secretary of the branch committee.

If the application is approved by the party branch, it is then forwarded to a higher party committee for final approval. In the case of an applicant from poor peasant or worker background, final approval can be made by the ch'ü (subcounty) committee; however, if the applicant comes from a less "pure" social and political background (such as a landlord family), the application must go to the hsien committee for final approval. If approval is given, notification of action taken by the ch'ü or hsien committee is then made in writing to the special district or provincial party committee, for their files.

All applicants admitted to the party have to serve a period of probationary or "trial" membership, which varies in length depending on their political and social backgrounds. For "poor" peasants and workers, this probationary period is six months; for persons from other social classes, it may be one year, two years, or even longer. During the probationary period the party tests the candidate's fitness, instructs him in party policies and operations, and familiarizes him with party procedures. The probational party member may attend nonconfidential meetings of his party branch, but cannot vote or be elected to party office; nor may he have access to classified materials.

At intervals during his probation, the new member is given orientation courses to familiarize him with party organization, aims, policies, and procedures and is tested periodically to ascertain his progress. If he shows outstanding progress, his period of probation may be shortened upon the recommendation of the party branch and the approval of a higher committee at the level of the ch'ü or hsien. If he shows a complete lack of progress, the branch may either recommend an extended period of probation or may cancel his probationary membership.

At the end of his period of probation, the records of the new party member are transmitted by his branch to a committee at the ch'ü or hsien level. If the higher committee approves, the new member is then formally inducted into the party at a special ceremony in the hsien, at which time he takes his oath of allegiance to the party and receives his party membership card.

Party membership cards are issued by the organization departments of the provincial party committees after notification by the special district committee. The cards, which are numbered in series, reportedly include the party rules, the party oath of allegiance, and a table of vital statistics on the party member. When a party member is transferred from one party organization to another, he takes the card with him. If he goes on a secret or dangerous mission, however, he leaves it with the secretary of his party branch. Loss of party cards must be reported to the appropriate regional party bureau, which in turn reports it to the Central Organization Department.

On becoming a regular member of the party the new recruit theoretically enjoys certain new rights and privileges, including the right to vote in party elections and to run for party office, to participate in "free and full discussions" at party meetings, to criticize any party functionary, and to submit proposals and suggestions to higher level. In practice, elections and discussions are often predetermined affairs, particularly above the county level, and freedom of criticism and discussion is narrowly limited.

(4) Promotions, Transfers, and Assignments of Party Members -- The shortage of trained and experienced cadres in the CCP has been further aggravated since 1950 by three developments: 1) the purging of lower and middle ranks of the party during the party reform movement, which began in March 1951; 2) Chinese involvement in the Korean war, which drained off additional cadres from the domestic scene; and 3) the decision to launch preparations for the beginning of a program of "planned economic construction" in 1952, which created an increased need for trained technical and administrative personnel. Reports on local party organizations in Central-South China during the latter part of 1952 indicated that party organizations at the ch'ü and hsiang levels in many areas were severely understaffed, with some cadres holding down 10 to 15 jobs at the same time.

The party leadership has attempted to make maximum use of talent and ability through a system of personnel ratings. The appraisal of party members is regarded as a two-way process, operating both from above and from below. Each party member is not only examined by his superiors, as to his ability, personal history, and performance, but he is also appraised by his colleagues and subordinates at periodic conferences during which he must defend himself against criticism. One important element in the appraisal of party members is the personal history record, which each member makes out on entering the party and again during periodic programs of party reform. This normally contains a full description of his social and political background and his motives for entering the party, as well as a frank confession of any doubts he may have concerning the party. This personal history record becomes a permanent part of the man's personnel file, along with an elaborate dossier with more than 40 different classifications and containing comments on his past performance, including any disciplinary violations. These dossiers are kept by the Department of Organization at each level of the party, and copies are also filed with the Central Organization Department.

Promotions and assignments within the party have been based on three major criteria. The first and most important of these is "te," which implies political reliability, high personal character, and willingness to accept responsibility. The second, "ts'ai," connotes ability and education, including administrative ability, technical skills, and knowledge of Communist theory. The third and least important is "tzu," involving length of service in the party, popularity, and ability to get along with people. Each party member is graded as to his fitness for promotion according to the above criteria, being rated "excellent," "good," "fair," or "poor" on each. When a vacancy occurs, a higher-level committee of the party will "nominate" a candidate for promotion, and this nomination is then confirmed at a still higher level. (In the case of ch'ü /subcounty/ cadre, nomination would come from the hsien or special district and confirmation from the province.)

It is quite clear that CCP rating and promotion policies have tended to place primary emphasis on political reliability, loyalty, and actual performance of assigned tasks, and a much lesser emphasis on education and seniority (length of service in the party). Party leaders apparently feel that it is better to train reliable people than to utilize people who are well-educated but politically unreliable. Party directives on promotion during 1951 and 1952 played down the importance of seniority as a criterion and emphasized the need to promote young cadres who had proved their worth, regardless of their length of service in the party. This new attitude toward seniority was part of a more general attack on the old cadres which began in 1950 and continued into 1951. During this period, the older cadres were scolded for their "arrogance" and warned that they would be judged by their performance, and not by the fact that they had many years of party service.

Very little is known about the rotation and transfer of party cadres, but it would appear that the cadres at lower levels are rotated fairly often. Party cadres in the army are apparently rotated every three years, and an attempt is made to have them serve both at the central and local levels. A similar policy may be followed in the party. Party directives during 1952, however, emphasized that cadres should be promoted from within local party organizations rather than transferred from other organizations. Excessive turnover of local personnel was also discouraged.

The transfer and assignment of party cadres in the government appears to be handled jointly by party organization departments and by government personnel departments at the corresponding levels of party and government organization. When the large-scale transfer of technical

personnel was being carried out during the fall of 1952, joint party-government personnel offices were set up to "study and investigate available supplies of technical personnel and to expedite their appointment and reassignment." Recent reports indicate that the machinery for transferring and assigning technical personnel is not working well. In some cases local party organizations have attempted to retain their technical cadres and to circumvent attempts to transfer them--probably a reflection of the acute shortage of technicians and of the consequent need to retain existing personnel. Recent party directives have censured local party organizations for adopting a "too conservative" approach toward promotions, and have instructed them to promote deserving cadres from within their own ranks.

(5) Party Training and Indoctrination

(a) General Features -- There are three major types of party training: 1) indoctrination in Communist theory, policies, and procedures; 2) general education, including the development of literacy; and 3) specialized technical training. Of the three, political training is clearly the most important in terms of both time consumed and the number of party members involved. Party schools are largely concerned with political training; for administrative and technical training, the party relies on other agencies, such as military and political institutes, and technical institutes set up under the various ministries of the central government.

The problem of political training is crucial for at least three important reasons. First, party membership is heterogeneous; it embraces people drawn from various social and geographical backgrounds, and having widely varying levels of education. If party unity is to be maintained, there must be some means of creating a basic homogeneity of outlook, aims, and interests which will knit the various groups within the party together and keep all of them moving in a common direction. The unity of the party in fact, depends to a great extent on the ability of the party leadership to elicit a common adherence to a single orthodox body of principles and ideas, and to repress all tendencies that depart from that orthodox norm.

Second, the importance of party training is closely related to the problem of creating an effective chain of administrative command. Unless the rank and file party member is familiar with current party policies, he cannot correctly interpret or effectively carry out the day-to-day directives of the party leadership.

Third, party training plays a vital role in improving relations between the party and the "masses," including nonparty personnel in the government, army, and mass organizations. Party cadres at the local level have an important public relations function, and are expected to "sell" the policies of the party and to explain them to local nonparty people. Unless the local cadre himself has a sound grasp of policies, he cannot effectively carry out his public relations work, and may actually injure the party by alienating potential supporters.

The CCP views party training as a continuous process. Party education is regarded as being inseparable from the process of party discipline, as a constant and never-ending process of self-cultivation and self-discipline, designed to orient the individual party member both to his fellow members and to the party leadership. In this sense it is both a unifying and a centralizing force: it promotes greater solidarity among the rank and file and at the same time makes the lower party membership more responsive to the will of the party high command. The normal, continuing process of political training in the party is often linked with, and reinforced by, special and more intensive programs of ideological remolding (*cheng-feng*). These programs are aimed at eradicating any deviationist tendencies which may have crept into the thinking of party members.

Although the party was forced to rely on informal instruction rather than on highly formalized training programs during the post war period of expansion, there is evidence that a highly systematic indoctrination program (described in section III of this pamphlet) was developed immediately following the Communist seizure of power. The intensity of the indoctrination program was presumably an outgrowth of the party's desire to compensate for the anticipated ad hoc nature of later on the job training during the party expansion period.

(b) Program Direction -- Responsibility for the direction of party training seems to have been delegated to provincial and local party organizations. Party committees at each level have general responsibility for setting up training programs and for running party schools. Party secretaries often assume personal direction of important programs and brief their subordinates on aims and methods. In some cases the provincial and municipal party committees set up special subcommittees on party

education which draw up study plans and review progress made. According to directives issued in 1950, these committees were to be headed by full-time educational directors, but it is not clear whether this was actually done. Departments of propaganda at each level appear to have responsibility for determining the degree of progress made in study programs and for preparing and issuing study guides and manuals. Local party committees at the hsien and ch'ü levels are supposed to have one or two cadres permanently assigned to party training work. Much of the responsibility for party training devolves upon the party branch, which is the vehicle for training new members.

To date, the local party organizations appear to have considerable freedom to plan study programs and select study materials. However, there appears to be some review of study plans by higher levels of the party, and the central and provincial party organizations assign special personnel to inspect the progress of training programs at the local level.

Since the middle of 1952, party leaders have been making an effort to develop more uniform methods and to set up more systematic political training programs. Directives issued in August 1952 by regional party bureaus called on all provincial and hsien party committees to organize systematic study of party policies and directives and to assign qualified party instructors to give lectures on party theory and policy. Party committees at the provincial and municipal level were instructed to set up "study rooms" and evening schools for political study work.

In an effort to facilitate the supervision of party indoctrination work by party committees, CCP leaders have attempted to establish a formalized system of inspection and verification. Party instructors in each local party branch are required to file with their local ch'ü committee a detailed report on each indoctrination session, including an account of the contents of lectures given, the number of party members present, and other observations. The various ch'ü party committees then prepare a monthly summary of such reports, adding comments on the reactions of the party members. The summary is then forwarded to the hsien (county) committee, which in turn prepares a summary for higher-level committees at the provincial level.

Little information is available on party schools and training facilities. From available data it would appear that party schools are principally concerned with political indoctrination rather than with administrative or technical training.

Formal party schools appear to exist only at the higher levels of the party--the national, regional, provincial, and the special municipal. At the national level, there is believed to be a Higher Party School, directly under the Central Committee. At the provincial and municipal levels, there are party schools or party research institutes under the direction of propaganda departments or party educational committees. The Northeast Party Bureau, for example, was known to have a party school that gave eight months' training to cadres assigned to state enterprises. Provincial party schools give training courses for cadres from the hsien and ch'ü, who are selected for training by the provincial departments of organization and propaganda. Provincial and municipal party committees in some areas have set up "spare-time ideological schools," offering refresher courses in party theory; as of January 1953, there were over 800 such schools with a claimed enrollment of over 400,000.

Higher party cadres in the Peiping area have been assigned to two schools: the Marxist-Leninist Institute, which gives regular courses in Marxist theory, and the Chinese People's Revolutionary University, which has evening classes for party cadres. Both schools are reported to have Soviet instructors.

At the local level party training media are more informal. Major emphasis is on general education rather than on theoretical studies. Ward committees in the larger cities have set up evening classes in reading and writing and general education for cadres from peasant and worker families. Hsien committees organize short-term training classes for new recruits and refresher training classes for cadres selected from the lower levels of the ch'ü and hsiang party units.

(c) Types and Content of Training -- The type of training a party member receives depends upon such factors as his previous education, his length of service in the party, and his place in the party hierarchy. New party members are expected to acquire some familiarity with the party constitution and general program, as well as with party history and the requirements for party membership. Party members with a low level of general education are expected to concentrate on such basic subjects as history, geography, and current events; those who are illiterate are taught to read basic texts. Lower- and middle-ranking cadres with a fair amount of formal education are

expected to familiarize themselves with basic policy documents having direct bearing on their work. Higher-level cadres, who have had considerable education and long periods of party service, are expected to master more advanced theoretical works by party leaders. Party cadres who are assigned to work in factories and state enterprises are expected to develop technical skills.

1) Political Training -- New members of the party are required to take a basic orientation course in "General Political Knowledge." This course is based on a text issued in 1952 by the editors of Hsüeh Hsi (Study), a magazine, and involves instruction in party history, party organization, and party politics. More advanced beginners pursue individual study of assigned reading, with group discussions under the guidance of trained instructors. Less advanced students who are poorly educated, listen to lectures and are then examined on what they have learned. The length of this course varies with the individual's progress. After he completes this training, the party cadre is expected to continue his party studies on a regular basis. As a rule, two days a month are set aside for the study of basic party documents.

The materials most commonly assigned for study among party members fall into two broad categories: 1) basic theoretical works and 2) basic policy documents, directives, instructions, and laws. The theoretical materials include basic works by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin (brought together in a collection known as "Required Reading for Cadres" /Kan-pu Pi-tu/), as well as the collected works of Mao Tse-tung. The study of these more esoteric doctrinal works seems to be largely confined to the "leading cadres" (party secretaries and higher-ranking officials) at each level of the party.

Policy documents assigned for study include the directives, resolutions, and reports of the Central Committee; important policy statements and speeches by party leaders; laws and administrative reports of the central government; and the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference--a compendium of basic policies. These documents are studied by party rank and file as well as by the higher echelons. Through study-guides and lectures which furnish explanatory comments, an effort is made to relate these documents to actual problems of daily experience. Auxiliary study materials frequently used include those relating to party history and to current events.

If the party wants a given set of policy documents studied by all members, the party Central Committee may issue a general directive to all party organizations at the provincial and municipal levels, ordering them to initiate study programs. The leading officials at the provincial and municipal level then convene "cadre conferences" to explain the purpose and aims of the proposed study program and to establish the correct "line" to be followed. The study program is widely publicized in party newspapers and radio broadcasts, and detailed study instructions are issued by the regional bureaus and provincial committees to the various local units of the party. The documents are discussed in local forums and symposia under the guidance of party instructors. At various points during the study campaign examinations are held and tours of inspection are conducted by special personnel from the provincial and regional party organizations.

During 1952 a special campaign was launched in the party to promote a greater knowledge of party history. The standard history of the CCP, by Hu Ch'iao-mu, was assigned as basic reading. Regional departments of propaganda set up special training courses for history instructors, who were selected from among members of provincial and municipal committees of the party and given three to four months of training.

During the early part of 1952 the party organizations in Peiping conducted a survey of newspaper reading habits among party cadres and discovered a serious ignorance of current events. In order to remedy the situation, the party leadership instructed party committees at all levels to encourage newspaper reading and to set up a system of regular briefing on current events. Propaganda departments at all levels were to conduct periodic examinations to determine the effectiveness of such programs.

Since the middle of 1952 party training programs have been closely integrated with the current program of party reorganization and reform. Directives issued by various regional party bureaus in August and September 1952 decreed that "party reform studies" would constitute the most important part of all political study during the latter half of 1952. Plans announced at that time provided that eight hours a week would be spent in study and three more hours in group discussions. For study purposes cadres were to be divided into two major groups: group I, consisting of low-ranking party cadres and those with little political training, was to concentrate on mastering the basic

tenets of the party constitution and the criteria of party membership set forth by An Tzu-wen in June 1952; group II, including higher-ranking party members of the hsien and above, was to study more esoteric documents on party policy.

In July 1953 the Central Committee of the party instructed all party cadres to study chapters IX through XII of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and selected works of Lenin and Stalin on Socialist economic construction in order to learn from the experiences of the Soviet Union. Study groups were expected to devote 4-6 hours per week to this assignment.

2) Technical and Specialized Training -- As Communist China embarks upon a new phase of "planned economic construction," involving the building of a modern industrial plant, it is confronted with a serious shortage of trained technical personnel. Estimates compiled in the spring of 1952 indicated that over 500,000 technical and administrative personnel would have to be trained to meet the requirements for proposed projects. China's existing training facilities, according to CCP estimates, are still inadequate for the job. Since the party intends to control the economic enterprises, it must have at its disposal a core of politically reliable technicians to be used as leaders and "shock troops" in the needed army of technicians. Speeches by party leaders during the latter part of 1952 placed increasing emphasis on the need for party members to acquire technical skills and to study industrial management.

Technical training for party cadres appears to be administered by joint committees composed of representatives from the party and government. Party cadres are usually assigned by such committees to one of the many technical schools now set up under the central government. One of the most important schools to which cadres have been assigned for technical or administrative training is the Central Institute of Finance and Economics, established in October 1952. This school, which has courses in trade, industrial management, finance, taxation, and economic planning, appears to have been created as the principal training center for top-level cadres in financial and economic branches of the government.

Since the middle of 1952 the CCP has established numerous other technical schools, most of them under central economic ministries such as the Ministries of Fuel, Railways, Heavy Industry and Geology. These schools are scheduled to give courses of training in forestry, engineering, metallurgy, water conservation, surveying, transportation, and navigation. Apparently many of the schools are still in the planning stage.

3) Party Training for Nonparty "Activists" -- The CCP has assigned considerable importance to the training of "active elements" in both rural and urban areas. By such training the party apparently hopes to create a reservoir of politically reliable people who can be drawn upon as future members of the CCP.

In December 1951 the East China Bureau of the CCP announced a plan to indoctrinate all urban workers in the East China area by the end of 1953. The workers were to be rotated for training in party schools, New Democratic Youth League schools, government cadre schools, and revolutionary universities. Training materials were to be disseminated among the workers by propaganda departments. During 1952 party committees in several large cities in East China set up party schools and spare time classes for urban workers. Courses lasted from 3 to 6 months and were designed to familiarize workers with the requirements for party membership. In June 1952, party organizations in Kiangsu announced a plan to set up short-term training classes for urban workers in five major cities. Party schools in each of these cities were to conduct seven or eight classes with 300 to 500 students in each. One-third of the graduates of these classes were to be considered for party membership. In some of the larger cities, such as Nanking, classes have reported enrollments of over 1,200.

Party political training for activists has also been carried on in rural areas, but apparently on a smaller scale. In May 1952 a Central Committee directive instructed all hsien committees to set up short-term training classes for village activists to study the CCP. Students were to be selected by the ch'ü party committees and training was to last three to five weeks. Graduates were then to be interviewed by local party members, and those who showed promise were to be considered for membership.

4) Training Publications and Party Newspapers -- The CCP provides a variety of publications for training purposes. Responsibility for preparing and distributing such training

materials within the party ranks rests with the Central Propaganda Department and its branches at the various levels, including branches within the political departments of various army units.

The most important single training publication issued by the CCP is a monthly journal called Hsüeh-hsi (Study), which was inaugurated in September 1949. This publication, which features articles on problems of doctrine and of study, was designed to assist cadres to gain a better mastery of party theory and to improve their study methods. Because of an incorrect "line" taken by editors of Hsüeh-hsi concerning the problem of the "national bourgeoisie," the magazine was forced to suspend publication in April 1952, and apparently did not resume publication until August 1952. One of the most influential Communists now connected with this magazine is Hu Sheng, a member of the Central Department of Propaganda. As noted before, cadres also study the eight-volume Kan-pu Pi-tu and the collected works of Mao Tse-tung.

For less advanced cadres there is a simplified study primer (Hsüeh-hsi ch'u-chi pan), which was first published in March 1951. This book seeks to explain party policies in simple language and to relate them to concrete problems of everyday party life. A political textbook for beginners, General Political Knowledge, was published in 1952, and contains information on the party's program, organization, and history.

In addition to these publications, there are training manuals for party cadres engaged in various types of administrative work, in the land reform program, propaganda, industry, agriculture, health, and other programs. Prepared and distributed by party propaganda departments at the central, regional, and provincial levels, these manuals outline and explain party policies and work methods.

Another important type of publication is the party newspaper, which usually contains important directives, speeches by party leaders, and "party life" columns discussing various features of party organization and activities. The most important party newspaper is the Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), the official organ of the Central Political Bureau of the CCP. Its editorials established the official party line on all major issues and herald major party programs.

At least four provincial party committees have their own official newspapers. These are the Nan Fang Jih Pao in Canton; the Liao Ning Jih Pao in Mukden; the Chieh Fang Jih Pao in Shanghai; and the Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao in Hankow.

In addition to these provincial newspapers, special party publications are also put out by the party committees in each of the larger cities. The Tientsin Party Committee, for example, issues a semimonthly periodical called Chih-pu Sheng-huo (Party Branch Life), which contains editorials defining the party line as well as short articles on party activities in various fields.

Party cadres in the armed forces also have their own newspapers, which are published and edited by special sections of the Political Departments at Army Headquarters. These contain items of general news interest as well as articles on military life. Higher-ranking party cadres in the armed forces are furnished with classified circulars, which give them a less distorted version of the news than is provided in the armed forces newspapers.

In addition to its training publications and newspapers, the party also uses the regular regional radio networks to transmit elementary lessons on political matters prepared by the party propaganda departments.

(6) Party Discipline and Morale

(a) The Problem -- The CCP has long recognized the need for strict party discipline-- discipline that would elicit prompt obedience to commands and enhance party unity by minimizing tendencies toward factionalism and separatism. Many important pronouncements of the party leadership during the 1940's laid heavy stress on the importance of discipline. In July 1949, for example, Mao Tse-tung listed discipline among the three major factors contributing to the CCP's rise to national prominence. (The other factors were the party's command of an effective army and the use of united front tactics.) Since the party assumed national power and now spreads its administrative talents over a broad territorial base, party leaders have been even more concerned with emphasizing the need for unfaltering, iron-clad discipline among the rank and file. The rapid growth of the party's membership after 1948 created complex problems of discipline and morale. During the period

1948-50 there was a general lowering of admission standards and a consequent dilution of the party's ranks with people who were not always politically reliable and who often had only a vague concept of the party's program. A second major development which had important repercussions on party discipline and morale was the unexpectedly rapid victory of the Communist armies over the Nationalist forces in 1948-49. The shift of the party's base of operations from the countryside to the cities not only brought new and more complex problems of administration but also posed new obstacles to the maintenance of party esprit de corps. Party members who had lived a hard and ascetic life in rural areas were suddenly exposed to the comparative luxury of urban life, and were brought into close daily contact with the urban middle class. The dangers inherent in this situation were discerned by party leaders as early as 1949. A resolution of the Central Committee warned that:

Now that we are victorious, it is possible that some party members may choose to indulge in a life of ease rather than live the old life of hardship. . . . It is possible that some of our members who were invulnerable to the real bullets of the enemy may now be vulnerable to the sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie.

As later developments proved, these fears were not unfounded. During 1950 and 1951, there was increasing concern with the danger of "bourgeois corrosion" of the party. Party leader Kao Kang, speaking in January 1952, declared that:

Despite repeated warnings, the party has been increasingly corroded by bourgeois ideologies and influences. . . .

The campaign against waste, corruption, and red tape in government launched during the winter of 1951-52 revealed fairly widespread corruption among middle-ranking party officials in many of the larger urban centers such as Tientsin and Wuhan.

The danger of "bourgeois corrosion" was not entirely an urban phenomenon; it had a counterpart in the villages. After the completion of land reform, the first stage of the agrarian revolution, there was a natural tendency for the rural party cadres to relax and to feel that "the revolution is over." The growing "complacency" and "apathy" of the rural cadres was bitterly attacked in editorials in party newspapers during 1951-52. Official CCP reports during January-April 1952 noted a widespread growth of "rightist tendencies" among rural cadres, including the exploitation of hired labor, money-lending at high rates of interest, a tendency toward soft living, and "arrogant attitudes toward the masses."

In addition to the dangers of "bourgeois corrosion," the party also had to face the personnel problems created by the establishment of a vast bureaucratic apparatus. Many party members developed "bureaucratic tendencies" that sorely perturbed the top leadership. Party leader Mao Tse-tung, in his address to the fourth session of the CPPCC National Committee in February 1953 noted that too many "leading cadres" in the central offices were content to sit in their offices and merely issue directives, without making any attempt to check upon their implementation. Other reports from party leaders noted that local cadres were using illegal methods to carry out party programs and were violating laws. The problem of eliminating such "bureaucratic tendencies" is viewed as a long-term struggle, necessitating constant attention.

One special aspect of the problem of eliminating bureaucratic trends in the party has been the increase in "empire-building" among local party organizations. While it is difficult to estimate the extent of such tendencies, it is apparent that there have been several isolated cases of insubordination involving the refusal of local party authorities to carry out orders received from central and regional party organizations. One example was the case of the Wuhan Committee of the CCP, which was accused of attempting to circumvent the orders of the Central Committee regarding the punishment of certain of its members. Another example was the case of Chou Chin-heng, Governor of Kirin (Chi-lin), who was alleged to have ignored orders from higher party authorities, leaving them unopened on his desk. Several other middle-ranking party officials purged during 1951-52 were accused of insubordination. An editorial in the Peiping People's Daily, official publication of the Politburo, on January 23, 1953, attacked local party leaders who were using their position to "set up an administration resembling an independent kingdom and who think they can do as they please."

Another aspect of discipline and morale causing the party leadership considerable trouble is the problem of the older cadres. These men, having borne the brunt of the party's long military struggles, feel that they deserve special consideration and resent the assignment of younger

men to more desirable positions. Since late 1950, the party leadership has repeatedly warned these older cadres that they will not be given special concessions merely because of their long service in the party.

(b) Incentives -- In attempting to promote discipline and morale, the party leadership has at its command a number of methods for persuading or coercing the party rank and file into doing its bidding. These may be summarized briefly under the general headings of incentives and controls.

The incentives are both material and psychological. Although the tangible material advantages to be gained from membership in the party are not necessarily great, the individual Chinese by joining the party, gains access to an elite organization commanding a virtual monopoly of political power and patronage. He thereby greatly increases his chances of securing a desirable position and of obtaining promotions and special privileges. Although the average party member enjoys a certain degree of material security, he does not appear to have many material comforts, and in fact is expected to live a fairly austere and ascetic life. Party members who manage to live extravagantly run the constant risk of being denounced for "bourgeois decadence" and the frequency with which the party has punished cadres who have indulged in material comforts has probably discouraged any open display of personal luxury. One of the reasons for emphasizing austerity is probably a realization that the type of fanatic zeal desired of the party member is best maintained through asceticism and will soon dissipate once the party members begin to live in material comfort. A large number of party members (at least 1,000,000 of them in 1950) have been placed on a "military supply system," under which they receive, instead of regular salary, a subsistence allowance in the form of food, housing, clothing, and some medical care. Subsistence varies according to rank. Lower-ranking party members eat "large kitchen" food, which is quite coarse; only a few high-ranking party members enjoy "small kitchen" food, which is of good quality. Similar distinctions are preserved with respect to housing. Lower-ranking party members live in dormitory style, often separated from their families; higher officials have private houses, cars, and sometimes servants.

In an attempt to compensate for the comparative lack of material incentives among the rank and file party members, the party leadership has attempted to develop a system of non-material incentives to supplement the general political indoctrination programs. The party constitution provides that any party member or party organization may be commended for: 1) demonstration of absolute loyalty to the party cause; 2) display of exceptional initiative in carrying out the programs and policies of the party; 3) exemplary observance of party discipline; and 4) marked success in fulfilling party assignments and tasks. The evidence indicates that such commendations are actually given. Moreover, from time to time the party has launched a series of "emulation campaigns" within the party, aimed at improving levels of performance. In one such campaign, in 1950, a point system was set up, and each party organization was given a performance rating. Those units and members showing unusual zeal were awarded special commendations.

(c) Controls -- The CCP leadership maintains control over the membership of the party by several means, including: 1) a system of surveillance and informants; 2) formal disciplinary machinery; and 3) ideological discipline reinforced by a system of psychological controls. Through this control machinery, which permeates all levels of the party, the party leadership has been able to maintain tension among the rank and file, detect disloyalty and "deviationist" thinking, compel obedience, and enforce a rigid orthodoxy of thought and behavior.

Very little reliable information is available concerning the party's system of surveillance. The center of the party's internal security network probably lies in the Central Control Committee, which is responsible for detecting evidence of disloyalty among party members. This committee maintains a vast network of informants reaching down into every unit of the party and army, and the activities of party members are thus thoroughly scrutinized. In addition, informants who report on party officials are believed to be scattered throughout the nonparty sector of the population. Under such a system party members know that any false move on their part will certainly be reported.

The formal disciplinary machinery of the CCP is also directed by the Central Control Committee through its branches at the provincial and municipal levels of the party. These agencies are subordinate to the various party executive committees; their functions are to investigate infractions of discipline by party organizations and by individual party members and to recommend appropriate punishment. The Central Control Committee probably works in close collaboration with the Ministry of Supervision which performs similar functions in the governmental hierarchy.

Disciplinary action against a party member ordinarily is initiated at the cell or branch level. An accused member has an opportunity to defend himself before a meeting of his cell. The cell members then make a recommendation to the branch committee, which reviews the report at a general meeting. In minor cases the party branch may take direct action, but in more serious matters the decision in the case must be referred to a higher party committee for "approval."

The party constitution outlines five types of disciplinary action which may be taken against individual party members: 1) private warning; 2) public warning; 3) removal from assigned work; 4) probation; and 5) expulsion from the party. In practice, these appear to be further refined into the following 10 degrees of punishment: 1) oral admonition; 2) oral warning; 3) public admonition; 4) public warning; 5) small demerit; 6) large demerit; 7) probation; 8) cancellation of membership; 9) temporary expulsion from the party, with the prospect of reinstatement; and 10) permanent expulsion, with no hope of reinstatement.

All punishments above "small demerit" appear to involve an automatic loss of all party offices. Cancellation of membership appears to be decreed for such offenses as failure to pay party dues and failure to participate actively in party activities over long periods of time. Probation appears to be prescribed for failure to meet party standards of performance. Expulsion from the party is supposed to be used with the greatest caution, and is reserved for grave offenses such as defection, deliberate sabotage of party policies, and insubordination. Capital punishment is not one of the regular sanctions used by the party itself; however, a member who has committed a serious offense against the state can be put to death, after trial and appropriate action by the People's Courts and other governmental agencies.

In addition to the sanctions that can be applied against individual party members, there are also collective sanctions that can be applied to party organizations as a whole. The party constitution of 1945 prescribes four types of collective punishment: 1) reprimand; 2) partial reorganization of the "leading body" (standing committee or executive committee); 3) dismissal of members of the "leading body"; or 4) dissolution of the entire party organization and complete reregistration of membership.

A party organization is usually disciplined by the party committee two levels above it in the party hierarchy; the action is "approved" by a party committee three levels above. For example, the decision to punish a hsien party committee would be taken by a provincial party committee, with the approval of the Central Control Committee. In practice, punishment often extends to party organizations above and below the offending organization. Thus, if a hsien party committee is found guilty of a violation of discipline and punished, the ch'u committees beneath it and the special district committee over it may also be forced to engage in "self-criticism" or some other official form of repentance.

In many respects, the most effective control wielded over the party membership consists of psychological pressures brought to bear on the individual to conform to rigid patterns of thought and behavior. In the party as a whole, this disciplinary process takes the form of an "intra-party struggle." For the individual party member it is expressed in the form of group meetings in which the sins and defects of members are discussed by the entire group.

The "intraparty struggle," as defined by party theoretician Liu Shao-ch'i, is a relentless struggle between the party ideologies and other ideologies, and between party interests and the interests of the individual. Its aim is to eradicate all tendencies within the party that tend to weaken the monolithic unity of the party and to create an attitude of mind among party members that will subordinate personal interests to those of the party. Theoretically the struggle is over principles and not personalities, and is supposed to be conducted in a spirit of "correcting mistakes" and not in a spirit of vengeance. Party members are exhorted to report to higher authorities all mistakes committed by their colleagues. Theoretically a party member may be criticized by both his superiors and by his subordinates, but in reality, criticism of superiors appears to be carefully channelled and often repressed.

This practice of "criticism and self-criticism"--a continuous process within the party ranks--is viewed as one of the most characteristic features of the CCP and is constantly cited as one of the essential elements of "democracy" within the party.

In addition to the "normal" process of ideological discipline, the party from time to time inaugurates special reform programs aimed at raising general levels of performance, "consolidating" the party organization by purging those members who fail to measure up to the party's standards, strengthening the party unity, and making the membership more responsive to central direction.

(7) Party Reform and Party Purge -- Periodic programs of party reform, often referred to as "ideological rectification" movements, are the equivalent for the party organization as a whole of self-criticism for the individual member. In contrast to the Soviet "blood purges," these reforms have emphasized the psychological approach; however they have made up in scope and intensity what they have lacked in violence. The reluctance of CCP leaders to carry out sweeping purges may be due in part to the urgent and constantly expanding need for trained party cadres.

Party reform movements seem to take place at critical points in the party's history. Each movement seems to be aimed at stiffening the moral fibre of the party by eradicating some particular defect in the party's operations and discipline. Since 1940, there have been five major reform movements--two preceded the party's rise to national power and three have followed it. The first reform, launched in 1942, was aimed at the eradication of "dogmatic" tendencies among the higher and middle echelons of the party; the second (1947-48) was directed primarily against "rightist" tendencies among rural cadres engaged in land reform. The third reform, launched officially in June 1950, followed closely on the party's rapid expansion of membership and the shift of the party's base to the urban areas. It was aimed in part at eradicating certain defects in the work methods and outlook of the local cadres, including "arrogance," "heroism" (selfish individualism) and "bureaucratic tendencies." This reform lasted until October 1950, and involved four stages: 1) the study of assigned documents, including reports by party leaders to the Central Committee; 2) the summarizing and review of past work and activities, with an eye to discovering mistakes; 3) an analysis of the current situation and of the tasks ahead; 4) criticism and self-criticism.

In the course of the reform, special ad hoc committees were set up under the regular party committees to direct reform activities, and special instructors were trained by party committees at the higher levels. At the local levels party cadres were reformed through training classes set up by the hsien party committees. Higher level cadres attended "remoulding conferences" held under the auspices of the provincial and regional party organizations.

The fourth party reform which was completed in the spring of 1954, was launched at a national conference on party organization held in March 1951. This reform movement was ostensibly designed to consolidate the party branches, to raise the general quality of party membership, and to strengthen the party organization as a whole for the forthcoming tasks of industrialization. Other underlying considerations probably prompting the reforms were: 1) a desire on the part of the party leadership to prevent the rank and file from relaxing; 2) a desire to discipline those party veterans who were showing signs of discontent and insubordination; and 3) a concern with growing corruption among the party membership and a general falling off of revolutionary zeal.

The specific aims and objectives of this reform program varied somewhat from time to time and from area to area. One of the basic aims was to familiarize the membership with the new and stricter standards of performance adopted in 1951 and then to appraise each member in terms of those standards. Members who fell hopelessly short of meeting the standards were expelled from the party; those, however, who evidenced a willingness to reform themselves were given a chance to do so. According to 1952 party directives the reforms were also aimed at eradicating corruption and "rightist" deviations (such as usury and exploitation), improving party control over rural organizations, and giving the rural party cadres a better understanding of Communist policies and objectives.

According to official Communist statements, this reform movement passed through four major stages. In the first stage--preparation and mobilization--party reform cadres were trained through conducting "experimental" reforms in key areas, and reports in the Communist press during December 1951 indicated that experimental reforms in two or three large cities had resulted in the disqualification of 8% to 10% of party members. By early 1953 the preparation and mobilization stage had been completed in most areas. This initial phase was followed by a "study" stage, in which party members received indoctrination on party objectives and goals and were expected to study assigned works on Communist theory and policy. The third stage was one of "reregistration," in which each party member made a detailed account of his political and social background and decided for himself whether he felt qualified to continue as a party member. The fourth and probably the most important phase was one of "appraisal," and it was centered in the party branch. The past history and performance of each party member was discussed individually by the branch meeting. Then, under the direction of specially assigned party reform cadres, the branch prepared a written report on each member, including recommendations for disciplinary action if needed. This report was forwarded to a higher party committee, which decided whether or not the party member shall remain in good standing. These appraisals were supposed to be conducted in accordance with the higher standards of performance adopted in March 1951.

During the period from January 1952 to June 1952, the party reform movement was closely integrated with the so-called "Three Anti" movement, which was aimed at eradicating corruption, waste and red tape from the ranks of the governmental bureaucracy. The "Three Anti" movement, which was directed by a national committee headed by party leader Po I-po, resulted in the expulsion or demotion of a fairly large number of party members holding middle-ranking positions in government and with about 10 to 15 years of service. Only about half the defendants were accused of "corruption." Other alleged crimes included insubordination, sabotage of party policies, nepotism, suppression of criticism from lower levels, empire-building, and "bourgeois decadence" (soft living).

Because of the paucity of available information, it is difficult accurately to gauge the effect of the "Three Anti" movement on the party organization. The number of party members actually expelled from the party appears to have been well under 5% of the total party membership, and perhaps as low as 1% or 2%. However, the sternness with which the reforms were conducted apparently caused a considerable loss of morale among lower- and middle-ranking party bureaucrats. Information from fairly reliable sources has indicated that there was an epidemic of suicides among party members in certain areas of South China during the early part of 1952. Many party members have tried to avoid being assigned to responsible positions in government, lest they become vulnerable to attack. The reforms may also have created a general inertia and apathy among the lower levels of the party, especially in urban areas.

As the "Three Anti" movement drew to a close after June 1952, the party reform campaign was increasingly oriented toward the party's national economic planning program and the development of precollective types of rural organization. An important editorial in the party press in July 1952 stated that "the work of consolidating the party must go hand in hand with the basic construction work of the state, and in particular with construction work centered on industrialization . . ." In September 1952 party organizations at the regional level issued directives stressing the need for "strengthening party leadership in various fields of national construction and urging party members to master technical skills and industrial management procedures."

From about October or November of 1952, the tempo of party reform activity apparently increased, especially in rural areas. Official reports indicated that "a general adjustment of Party organization and of the ideological levels of Party members" was launched among rural ground-level organizations of the party in November 1952, and stated that this had the result of "pushing the rural economy along the path of collectivization." Subsequent reports indicated that party reforms in rural areas of Northeast China would be completed by the spring of 1953. In January 1953 it was officially announced that the "streamlining" of party organizations in the northeast had been virtually completed in rural areas. In February it was announced that party organizations in North and Northwest China had "completed the first stages of party reform" and were starting on the second stage.

An important report by An Tzu-wen, Deputy Director of the Party Organization Department, released in February 1953, stated that party reform had been completed in 40,000 out of a total of 180,000 rural party organizations in China. Results to date, said An, indicated that about 90% of the total party membership measured up to standards set by the party leadership. Of the 10% who did not measure up, about 3% to 5% or less than 1% of the total party membership, had been expelled from the party as "undesirable elements." The remainder had withdrawn on the grounds that they had become "passive" or "backward."

The fourth and current reform movement, the Party Unity drive, was launched at a Central Committee meeting in February 1954. The general line for transition to socialism had been opposed by Kao Kang, head of the State Planning Commission, and other leading cadres who apparently split from the party center's program of gradual transition. The Party Unity drive was aimed at eliminating what was described as "despicable bourgeois individualism" although Kao Kang and his supporters were not announced as the offenders until March 1955. Liu Shao-chi stressed the need for absolute conformity during this "crucial historical stage of socialist transformation," and issued a stern admonition to those who "regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom." The Communist press followed up with continual attacks on "local nationalism, unprincipled disputes and controversies over personal aims," all of which were regarded as serious threats to party unity.

At the National Conference of the CCP in March of last year Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who had been director of the Organization Department, were identified as the leaders of an "anti-party faction which undermined party solidarity and unity." The resolutions of the National Conference

provided for the replacement of central and local discipline inspection committees, which were "no longer adequate to the task of strengthening party discipline in the new era of class struggle," with central and local control committees. This new system is designed to eliminate the lack of centralization which had characterized the party's disciplinary machinery. Local discipline inspection committees had been responsible only to the regional or provincial party committees which had established them. According to the procedures decided on at the National Party Conference and endorsed by the Central Committee in April 1955, lower control committees, though elected by local party conferences and congresses, are now subordinate to the Central Control Committee.

II. The Ideal Party Member

II. The Ideal Party Member

The articles which are included below were extracted from speeches which were written in 1939 by Politburo members Ch'en Yün and Liu Shao-ch'i. These articles appear here as they were translated from Cheng-feng wen-hsien (Documents on the correction of unorthodox tendencies) pp 67-82 and 83-121; edited by Chieh-fang she (The Emancipation News Agency), Yenan; published by Hsin-hua shu-tien (New China Book Company), Shansi-Chahar-Hopei branch, Kalgan, March 1946, 297 pp. (Harvard-Yenching Library); and reprinted in the Documentary History of Chinese Communism, by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, with commentaries by these three writers.

1. How to be a Communist Party Member, Ch'en Yün
2. On the Training of a Communist Party Member, Liu Shao-ch'i

Though written by different men, the following documents have a common purpose--to set before the actual or prospective Party member a model of ideal Communist behaviour. While Ch'en Yün's article was written before the official beginning of the Cheng-feng movement for the "correction of unorthodox tendencies" it reflects the aim of that movement to reassert the basic Leninist conception of Party organization.

In world Communist literature these articles represent nothing new. Whole sentences and paragraphs are reminiscent of passages found in similar hortatory literature published by Communist parties elsewhere. There is, to be sure, a certain Chinese flavour which expresses itself in the unabashed use of moralistic phrases, some of which are reminiscent of the Confucian classics and out of keeping with the Marxist prejudice against moral valuations. But in other respects there is nothing unique. The chief significance of these documents lies in the fact that the Party chose to re-emphasize its basic principles during this period, in an evident determination to maintain its Leninist foundations in the midst of all the changes brought about by the war-time shift to the united front.

What do these two primers convey to the Party follower? The Communist Party, we learn, is the Party of the proletariat. It is from this fact that it derives its infallibility and its exclusive mission to redeem mankind; for the industrial proletariat, according to Marx, is the class destined by History for this task. But since by 1939 the Party no longer had much contact with China's industrial proletariat, Ch'en and Liu did everything possible to conceal this embarrassing fact. Their first expedient is simply to ignore it. "The Chinese Communist Party," Ch'en informs us, "is organized by the awakened and progressive elements of the proletariat." Their next expedient is to admit "the weakness of Party work in the urban workers' movement," and to call for more vigorous efforts to gain control of the urban proletariat. This blandly overlooks the fact that, while such exhortations are a conventional feature of CCP literature during the whole period from the early thirties until the late forties, at no time during these years does the CCP seem to have diverted any significant portion of its energies from the task of winning a peasant base to the task of recapturing a city base. Finally, Ch'en and Liu use the expedient of confusing the rural proletariat with the proletariat proper, in spite of the fact that neither Marx nor Lenin accepted such an identification. Lenin provides for the absorption of "rural proletarians" into the Party, but always on the condition that the Party has a solid base in the urban proletariat. "Only the industrial proletariat," Lenin states, "led by the Communist Party can liberate the toiling masses of the countryside from the yoke of capital." However, having concealed the Party's doubtful foundations by these expedients, Ch'en and Liu are now free to ignore this anomaly.

In spite of the fact that during this period the Party rank and file were made up almost entirely of persons drawn from the peasantry and the intelligentsia, Ch'en and Liu disingenuously echo the usual Communist doctrine that all evidences of human frailty and disharmony within the Party are due to infection by non-proletarian elements. How then can one distinguish truly proletarian elements from non-proletarian elements in a party in which few actual proletarians are to be found? This can be done only by making a total inversion of certain Marxist presuppositions. Instead of deducing ideological tendencies from class affiliations, it now becomes necessary to deduce class affiliations from ideological tendencies. Elements within the Party which "are capable of dedicating themselves to Communism and the proletarian mission" are *ipso facto* true representatives of the proletariat. Elements which introduce disharmony into the Party or are disloyal to the Party's principles represent non-proletarian classes. Thus purity of belief becomes the criterion of class purity. Those

who stray from the correct line can be freely bracketed with the exploiting classes, whatever their actual class origins may have been. Ultimately, of course, this holds true for all Communist Parties everywhere. But where a Party still enjoys actual ties to the industrial centres and draws a substantial portion of its membership from the proletariat, it is still possible to point to the existence of an actual "proletarian core" as evidence of the legitimacy of the Party's claims.

The experience of the Chinese Communist movement in its Maoist development thus makes it amply clear that the Leninist formula of Party organization and the Leninist strategy of political action can both be maintained in an environment where the industrial proletariat is practically non-existent. This suggests that a Communist Party is a political instrument which derives its dynamism not from any organic tie with the industrial proletariat, but from the fact that it is a tightly organized, highly disciplined community--or élite corps--of believers which bases itself and rises to power on the dynamism of mass discontent. The mass basis of the movement can be furnished by the peasantry just as effectively as by the industrial proletariat.

Ch'en Yün's account is particularly valuable for his enumeration of certain minimum core beliefs which the Communist must accept. "First of all," he states, "it is necessary to understand the pattern of historic development of human society and have a firm faith in the inevitable realization of a Communist society in the future." In other words, the Hegelian belief in a redemptive History lies at the very heart of the faith. The Communist, like the Marxist in general, must feel that he is operating within a definite pre-established plan of history--a plan which can be discerned in both its past and future developments by those properly equipped to have such knowledge, and a plan which finally culminates in an ideal society. Unlike other Marxists, however, the Communist believes that this plan can finally be realized only by the Party, which is, as it were, a living church incarnating the historic will; it alone is equipped to discern the unfolding plan of history from moment to moment and to act on this knowledge. We are thus not surprised to find that the catalogue of virtues prescribed by Ch'en and Liu for CCP members all cluster about the cardinal virtues of devotion and loyalty to the Party.

It is implied throughout that the Party is, in a sense, a living entity which transcends its human cells. The Party member's dedication to the Party is therefore a dedication to a supra-human being. It is not pointed out, however, that this being can act, think, and plan only through the minds of concrete individuals, and that the assumed infallibility of the Party remains incarnate in the Party leadership so long as that leadership maintains itself in power. The Party member's spirit of self-sacrifice must thus rest not only on his faith in the Party as an abstract entity, but also on his faith that the Party leadership at any given time is the proper embodiment of this entity.

Another point which neither article dwells on is the fact that a Communist Party does not rely entirely on the virtuous conduct of its members. The sanction of force lurks always around the corner. It is of course true that the CCP in its New Democracy phase has been strikingly unusual in this respect. Having taken the leadership of the Chinese revolutionary movement, it has been able to draw on the enthusiastic devotion of young believers, eager to help save China by patterning their lives on the image of the model Communist. To the extent that the Party has been able to rely on such devotion, it has been able to keep the potential sanction of force well in the background.

In brief, then, these articles of Ch'en and Liu demonstrate that at the very height of the Yenan period the CCP was determined to maintain its basic Leninist principles of organization in all their pristine vigour within the Party, at the same time that it stood for the national united front in Chinese politics and impressed foreign observers as being more gradualist than revolutionary in its day-to-day programme.

CH'EN YÜN: HOW TO BE A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
(May 30, 1939)

I. Qualifications for Party Membership

The CCP is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. If (it) is to be so, one of the most important conditions is that it retain the purity of its membership. Accordingly, the question of the qualifications for joining the Party must be a constant preoccupation of the Party. To win members for the Party is the duty and constant task of every CP member. Accordingly, the question of the qualifications for Party membership must be thoroughly understood by every comrade of our Party.

1. Who May Join the CP?

According to Article II of the CCP Constitution, the following is stipulated regarding the question of qualifications for Party membership:

"Anyone who subscribes to the programme and Constitution of the CI and the CCP, enters one of the Party organizations and works with great energy in it, obeys all the resolutions of the CI and the Party, and pays Party dues regularly, may become a Party member."

The nature of the Party and the composition of the membership are closely linked to the question of qualifications for Party membership. In building up the Party, the question of the significance and function of Party membership occupies a very important place. It is, therefore, no surprise that it was precisely this question which aroused vehement argument and caused a serious split in opinion at the Second Congress of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia as early as 1903. It was to become the basic point of difference between Lenin and the Mensheviks.

Lenin maintained that: "Only one who subscribes to the Party programme, pays Party dues and participates personally in one of the Party organizations, may become a Party member."

But the provision drafted by the Menshevik Martov was: "Anyone who subscribes to the Party programme, pays Party dues and regularly supports the Party under the leadership of some Party organization may become a Party member."

According to the policy of Lenin, only those who actually participate in the organization, unreservedly obey the organization and are willing to devote themselves heart, body, and soul to the mission of the Party of Communism may become CP members. Lenin fought against Martov in order to establish his principles of Party organization, resolutely opposing Martov's proposal that persons be admitted to Party membership without actual participation or even the intention to participate but merely by giving sympathy or support outside the (Party) organization. This 100 per cent opportunist viewpoint not only obliterates the distinction between Party and class, but also changes the nature of the Party, degrading it to the status of a labour union or students' federation, making the Party "sink into a sea of sympathizers and opens the door for unstable, wavering, and opportunist elements" (Lenin). Thus the participation in a specific organization of the Party and positive work for the Party are the minimum requirements for each Party member.

Emphasizing the principle of Lenin, the Bolsheviks established their own fighting Party--a Party which was thoroughly Marxist and harmonious in ideology and organization. This event had a great international significance, establishing the fundamental principle of Party organization for Communist Parties throughout the world. If the CCP has become, during the eighteen years of struggle, a heroic, fighting, powerful party, it is because, at its First National Congress [1921], it fought against Li Hanchün's Menshevik legalism and laid down the foundation of the Party organization in accordance with Leninist principles.

With the great expansion of our Party membership today, this Leninist principle of membership has assumed an even more important significance. The tendency on the part of certain individual members of our Party to leave their posts or their work without Party permission must be corrected.

2. Every Party Member Must Subscribe to the Party Programme. This Does Not Mean, However, That He Must Have An Expert Knowledge of the Party Programme

Though at present the CCP does not yet have its own complete written Party programme, it nevertheless shares the general programme of Communist Parties throughout the world (the programme of the CI) and its own minimum programme (such as the policies of various Congresses and the Ten Great Policies [for anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation, 1937]). Acceptance of the Party programme is a prerequisite for admission to the Party. This does not, however, mean that an expert knowledge of the Party programme is a sine qua non; for only one who has received a thorough ideological training can be an expert on the Party programme. If applicants for Party membership, especially workers and peasants, are required to have an expert knowledge of the Party programme and Constitution before they are admitted to the Party, then not only will we have to reject many revolutionary elements of excellent quality among the candidates, but we will deny the Party's responsibility to train its members.

3. CP Members Must Not Only Participate Actively in the Struggle Against Japan, But Must Also Struggle for Communism

Not every person who engages actively in the anti-Japanese war can become a Party member. In order to request admission into the CP, he must subscribe to the Party programme and be willing to dedicate himself to the Communist cause of the liberation of the proletarian class and the whole of mankind. Therefore, the absorption of members into our Party should be based on a constant and systematic spread of propaganda concerning Communism and the Party programme among the masses, and on a careful observation and selection of the more progressive elements among the masses.

II. The Composition of Party Membership

The CCP is the vanguard of the proletariat and is organized by the awakened and progressive elements of the proletariat. But for the Party to be the vanguard of the proletariat there must be constant and systematic adjustment in the composition of our Party membership.

1. We Must, First of All, Strengthen the Representation of Superior Elements of the Working Class in the Party

The CP is the vanguard of the proletariat: "It must, therefore, first of all absorb (into the Party) all the superior elements of the working class" (Stalin), and systematically strengthen the proletarian core of the Party. This is a question of paramount importance for our Party organization.

The strengthening and expansion of the working-class elements in our Party has a great significance, especially at the present stage. The comparative weakness of Party work in the urban workers' movement, the unprecedented suppression of the working class in the past, and the occupation of large industrial cities (by Japan) during the war, have further aggravated the suffering and hardships of the Chinese working class. The increasing unemployment of huge numbers of workers and their dispersion throughout the country further increase the Party's tasks in absorbing workers into the Party. In cities, the Party must first concentrate on the absorption of workers as Party members, and in rural areas the Party should pay particular attention to the absorption of workers who have drifted from cities to villages, as well as hired farm hands and handicraftsmen. We can thus broaden the proletarian base of the Party, activate the workers to play a central role in the war of resistance, and strengthen the leadership of the workers over the vast masses of peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie.

It should be pointed out, however, that the CP is not a "labour party," but "an organized vanguard of the proletariat, the most advanced form of its class organization." Therefore, not all workers can join the Party, but only those superior elements who are most conscious, active, and faithful to the working-class mission.

2. The Party Must Pay Attention to Poor Peasants and Intellectual Elements

China is not an advanced capitalist country, but a backward semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. In such a country, there exist vast masses of poverty-stricken, revolutionary peasants. They live in an environment of suffering and suppression of all kinds, resulting in their support of the CP and their unflinching fight against imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the CP. Historical experience has amply vindicated the mighty role of the peasantry in the revolution; the poor peasants must remain, and will remain, the most powerful ally of the proletariat in the further progress of the revolution. Thus it is absolutely essential to absorb the active elements among the peasantry into the Party in great numbers, thus furnishing us with a social base of rural proletarians and poor peasants in the rural areas.

Similarly, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China also may play an important role in the revolutionary movement; it has been proved in the course of our revolution movement in the past and in the course of the present anti-Japanese war that many of them [the intelligentsia] have been able to fight heroically for a correct political cause. Due to their cultural level and political consciousness, they have served as a necessary bridge between the Party and the masses. Our Party should absorb a great number of revolutionary intellectual elements who are capable of dedicating themselves to Communism and the proletarian mission. At the same time, experience teaches us that we must emphasize the absorption into the Party of the more revolutionary and poorer elements among the intelligentsia. These revolutionary and poor intellectual elements

differ from the intelligentsia in general. Their poor living conditions make it easier for them to approach the Party. Furthermore, they are closer to the lower strata of society and their thinking and manner of life are closely linked to the poor masses. Thus they constitute ideal recruits for the expansion of the Party among the intelligentsia.

3. The Party Should Pay Particular Attention to Women Workers and the Poor, Revolutionary Women of the Petty-Bourgeois Class--Peasant Women and Women Intellectuals

Women constitute one-half of the population of China. Without women's participation in the revolution, the revolution cannot succeed. The number of women members in the Party is too small at present, primarily because not enough attention has been paid by the Party to the absorption of women Party members. We must oppose the excuse offered by some CP members for neglecting their duty of introducing women members: namely, that there is little chance for contact between men and women in Chinese society. All CP members, particularly women members, must regard the expansion of female membership as one of their important tasks. The Party must today emphasize (the task) of absorbing into its ranks revolutionary peasant women and women intellectuals in great numbers. The Party must regard this as a part of its regular activity and see to it that the political consciousness and the cultural level of its women members are enhanced through training and work.

4. All Party Members Must Struggle for the Communist Cause of the Proletariat

Workers are the foundation of the Party, and the Party must pay particular attention to the strengthening of the worker elements in our organization. Nevertheless, the Party will not refuse to admit people of other class origins who have undergone the training of daily economic struggle and of the revolutionary movement. They must, however, give up their former unproletarian, anti-Communist viewpoint and subscribe to the programme and Constitution of the Party before they can be admitted to the Party. Accordingly, the Party is firmly opposed to any viewpoint that does not insist on the purity of Party composition or the strengthening of its proletarian core, thus degrading the Party to a "national revolutionary alliance" of all classes.

III. The Procedure for Admission to Party Membership, Restitution of Party Membership, or Renewal of Membership

1. Established Procedure

For a new member to be admitted to the Party he must be sponsored by a (Party) member or members in accordance with Party provisions and current rules: for workers and hired farm hands, one sponsor; for a petty bourgeois, two sponsors; for those who leave other political parties to join our Party, three sponsors--approved by a Party group and chih-pu [Party cell] and certified by a higher Party committee. Those who have once belonged to other political groups must be approved by the district Party committee, the Central Branch Bureau, or the CC [of the CCP] (before they can be admitted into the Party).

2. Rules on Restitution of Party Membership or Rejoining the Party

The questions of restitution of Party membership and of rejoining the Party are to be dealt with in accordance with the decision of the CC and the nature of the circumstances. There are four basic principles:

(1) Those who have severed Party relations for a lengthy period but have nevertheless continued to work for the Party and whose status can be vouched for by members of the Party may be reinstated.

(2) Those who have severed Party relations for a lengthy period and claim to have continued their work for the Party, but are unable to produce Party members as witnesses, may rejoin the Party if they now possess the necessary qualification for Party membership. Reinstatement can be effected when witnesses are produced.

(3) All those who have had a long record of Party work but who have separated from the Party for a considerable time (up to one or two years) without committing any anti-revolutionary acts and have since been reinstated, shall not have the years of their absence included in counting their Party seniority.

(4) All those who have severed their relations with the Party for a long time without committing any acts harmful to the interests of the revolution and now possess the necessary qualifications for Party membership may be readmitted as new members after a considerable period of investigation.

As to those (former Party members) who have committed acts of political betrayal, no readmission into the Party is permissible.

IV. Party Members on Probation

1. Regulations on Duration of Probation

The length of the probationary period varies with the class origin of the new Party member. At present the probationary periods tentatively decided upon by the CC /For various classes/ are as follows: workers and hired farm hands, no probationary period; poor peasants and handicraftsmen, one month; revolutionary students, intellectuals, lower strata civil servants and white-collar workers, middle peasants, revolutionary soldiers, three months; other classes, six months, but this period can be prolonged under special circumstances. (See "Resolution of the CC on Expansion of Party Membership," March 15, 1938.)

2. The Functions of the Probationary Period, the Duties of the Sponsors, and the Procedure and Criteria for Induction as a Party Member in Good Standing

When non-workers join the Party, a certain probationary period is mandatory. The probationary period is used for education and checking. The Party should, in accordance with specific local conditions, give Party education to the members on probation, elevate their political level to that of a regular Party member by training them in Marxist-Leninist ideology, assign them specific work, and educate them through work. At the same time, during the probationary period, the Party should study the new member's personality and determine, by checking his personal history and other particulars, whether the candidate's political ideology, Party work, and devotion to the Party qualify him for Party membership; this is a preparatory step for his formal induction as a Party member.

Each new Party member must be recommended by a sponsor politically responsible for him. The sponsor bears an unfailing responsibility to the Party for the person he recommends. He should not only carefully observe what is expressed in the actions and words of the recommended person, but should also positively and patiently help and educate him in matters of politics and in his activities. The manner in which he fulfills this task can serve as a test of the responsibility and devotion to the Party of the member in question.

The criteria for induction as a Party member: the Party should rely upon the results of the training and investigation of the member on probation during the probationary period, in determining whether he has an adequate ideological understanding of the Party as well as a proper devotion to Communism and to his proletarian mission, and whether he has been constantly active in work and faithful to the Party in all his words and actions--it is by such patient methods that the Party is able to judge his preparedness to be a regular Party member. If the answer is affirmative, then with the approval of the group and cell and the endorsement of a Party committee at a higher level he may become a regular Party member through the regular procedure. When circumstances permit, a ceremony of induction may be carried out by the Party committee in accordance with concrete local conditions.

Thus induction into Party membership does not depend on the fulfillment of a probationary period, but is decided according to the candidate's degree of understanding of the Party. If, at the end of the probationary period, the necessary requirements for regular membership are not fulfilled (the probationary period) may be extended. The length of the extension should be equal to the original probation period. If found necessary, however, the probationary membership in the Party may be annulled. However, the extension of the probationary period should not be ordered lightly, as in the case of those who extend the probationary period for ten or twenty days as a measure of intra-Party punishment, etc.

As to young Party members, generally those under sixteen years of age are not eligible for Party membership. Those above sixteen may be recommended as members on probation; and those over eighteen may become regular Party members. But those under eighteen who already possess Party membership are to be allowed to retain their Party membership and are not to be dismissed or suspended.

3. The Rights and Obligations of Party Members on Probation

Party members on probation should carry out the work assigned by the Party, pay Party dues, and receive adequate Party training, which may take the form of studying certain Party documents and getting political and military training. Generally, Party members on probation have the right to speak at Party meetings, but do not have the right to vote. When one recommends a person for Party membership, he may first propose the candidate's name; after interviews and investigations by the cell, the formal recommendation will be made. In intra-Party work, members on probation are not eligible to serve as cell staff or group chairmen. However, under special circumstances, exceptions may be made to the above stipulation, as in cases where a new cell is being organized or a great majority of the cell are members on probation.

Members on probation are not eligible to attend certain Party meetings nor to read confidential documents of the Party.

V. The Criteria for a CP Member

1. The Life-Long Struggle for Communism

The CP is a party fighting for the complete liberation of mankind as well as for Communism and its proletarian mission. Therefore a CP member who is willing to dedicate himself to the Communist cause must not only fight for Communism, but also formulate a revolutionary view of life which will lead him to fight relentlessly for the realization of Communism. But how can one formulate and consolidate one's view of life? First of all, it is necessary to understand the pattern of historic development of human society and have a firm faith in the inevitable realization of a Communist society in the future. This is to say, a CP member should, on the basis of his class consciousness, his practical revolutionary experience, and his understanding of Marxism, grasp thoroughly the historic position and role of the proletariat in society, comprehend the interests of the proletariat and its liberating mission, and clearly discern the immediate policies and goal of the CP and its members. Only thus can he firmly formulate his view of life, follow it throughout his life, and struggle to the end for the realization of his convictions. At the same time, every member of the CCP should thoroughly understand that the Chinese revolution is a long, hazardous task, and that on the winding, treacherous path of revolution, a revolutionary must be prepared for prolonged hardship and setbacks; he must also be prepared at a critical moment to sacrifice his very life. Therefore, every CP member should not only have an unwavering faith in the realization of Communism, but also be resolved to fight to the very end, undaunted by either sacrifices or hardships, for the liberation of the working class, the Chinese nation, and the Chinese people.

2. The Interests of the Revolution Above All

Our Party is a political party aiming at the complete liberation of the proletariat of China, the entire Chinese nation and people, and the establishment of a Communist society; thus, the interests of the nation and the people and those of the Party are identical. CP members are fighters for a Communist mission under the leadership of the Party. Thus the interests of a Party member are identical with those of the nation, the people, and the Party. Every Party member should give his unlimited devotion to the nation, to the revolution, to our class, and to the Party, subordinating individual interests to those of the nation, the revolution, our class, and the Party.

However, in the course of revolutionary work as well as Party work, the individual interests of Party members may come into conflict with those of the Party. At such a time, every Party member should fall back on his unlimited devotion to the revolution and the Party, sacrifice unhesitatingly his individual interests and bow to the over-all interests of the revolution and the Party. (He must) put the interests of the revolution and the Party in the first place and deal with all individual issues on the principle that revolutionary and Party interests stand above all others. He must not place individual interests above those of the revolution and the Party.

"The interests of the revolution and the Party above all" is not an empty phrase. The Party not only demands that Party members understand this phrase, but also emphatically calls on every Party member to carry out this motto resolutely and unhesitatingly in practical life and in every concrete act of daily life. Only when our Party has members who are willing to sacrifice everything for the interests of the revolution and the Party can the successful accomplishment of the revolution by the Party be assured.

3. Obey Party Discipline, Keep Party Secrets

In the course of the Party's fighting experience during the past eighteen years, it has been proved that discipline is the guarantee of the execution of the Party line. In the past it was only by overcoming the Ch'en Tu-hsiu-Li-san line as well as the anti-revolutionary political line and sabotage of Chang Kuo-t'ao and others that we were able to assure the carrying out of our revolutionary mission at various stages, and the formation of the anti-Japanese, national united front as well as the prosecution of the present anti-Japanese war. From now on the Party must continue to insist on such discipline, "in order to consolidate the Party, overcome new handicaps, and win fresh victories" (resolution of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum November 1938 of the CC of the CCP). Therefore, it is the duty of every CP member to observe Party discipline resolutely and conscientiously. He should not only struggle with the tendencies that tend to undermine Party discipline, but should also struggle hard with his own words and actions which may tend to endanger Party discipline, in order to become a model in observing Party discipline. Do not think that merely stating one's support of, and voting for, the Party line at meetings or in the presence of the masses are enough for observing Party discipline; it is far from adequate. A good Party member who truly and conscientiously maintains discipline proves this discipline by his actions and dealings in the concrete issues of daily life. He shows himself to be a model in his resolute observation of the iron discipline of the Party.

The strengthening of our revolutionary power and the enhancement of the prestige of the CP have forced enemy agents, traitors, and anti-Communist elements to redouble their efforts to destroy the CP. Therefore, in Party work, the importance of secret work is by no means lessened. On the contrary, the Party should particularly strengthen its secret work, tighten discipline in secret work, and fight against any lack of vigilance regarding secret work. The Party must point out that there has been an extremely dangerous tendency in Party headquarters in certain areas to think that secret work may be slackened under present circumstances. Every Party member should not forget the lessons learnt from bloody experiences of the past resulting from the negligence of secret work. For the preservation of our strength in the war of resistance, and in order to assure the successful accomplishment of our revolutionary and Party mission, every Party member must greatly increase his political alertness. Every Party member must strictly observe discipline in the Party's secret work, and fight against all dangerous tendencies that tend to neglect or destroy the secret work of the Party. Any issue that is prohibited from being made public by the Party should never be revealed to the public without permission; any confidential matter which it is unnecessary to discuss with other Party members should not be talked about carelessly among other Party members. Any act that tends to destroy the secret work of the Party must be punished by Party discipline, even to the point of expulsion from the Party.

4. Carry Out (Party) Resolutions in the Face of All Obstacles

It is not enough for a CP member to support the resolutions of the Party verbally; it is his duty to carry out those resolutions with determination and put these resolutions into practice in his actions. In carrying out Party resolutions, it is sometimes inevitable that certain difficulties and set-backs may be encountered. CP members must overcome such handicaps with an unflinching and unbending spirit. Performing Party work passively like an indifferent employee is absolutely impermissible. The Chinese revolution is a task that involves tedious, prolonged struggles. One of the characteristics of the CCP is its indomitable spirit of sacrifice and struggle. Every CCP member must possess this hard-fighting spirit if he is to inherit and glorify the splendid tradition of the Party.

A CP member should not only be devoted to Party resolutions in his daily work, but must also remain faithful to the revolution and Party resolutions at trying and critical moments; faithful to the revolution and Party resolutions not only when there is close supervision by the Party, but also when there is none; (he must) carry out Party resolutions determinedly not only in the hour of victory but also in the hour of defeat. Only when one has a determined and stubborn heroic spirit can one be called a good CP member.

5. A Model for the Masses

The greater the political influence and the higher the prestige of the Party, the more will the working class and the masses expect from our Party members. Because they are CP members, the vanguard trusted by the masses, the masses expect of them a great deal more than they do from others. The masses often evaluate our Party by the acts of our Party members. The Party member must at all times and places create a favourable impression on the masses by his deeds, so as to create greater faith in, and higher respect for, our Party.

The Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, in November 1938⁷ called on all Party members to conduct themselves in an exemplary fashion, in the war of national liberation:

"(Party members) in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should serve as models of heroism in warfare and as models in the execution of orders, in their discipline, in political work, and in (maintaining) internal unity and solidarity. The CP members, in their relations with friendly parties and armies [i.e. at this time, the KMT and Nationalist forces] must stand firmly for (national) unity and solidarity, as well as for the policy of a united front. They should serve as models in carrying out their war duties. The words (of a Party member) should be made good in his deeds, and his deeds should be thoroughly carried out; he must be modest in manner, sincere in discussing problems and working with friendly parties and armies, (so as to) become a model in inter-party relations within the united front. In government work, CP members should be absolutely honest, free from nepotism, and serve as examples in working hard with little reward. In the mass movement, CP members must be the friends of the people, not their ruling officials; tireless instructors, not bureaucratic politicians. CP members at all times and places should never let their own individual interests take precedence. Individual interests must be subordinated to those of the nation and of the masses. Thus, selfishness, laziness, corruption, and vanity are (traits) to be most deplored. The spirit of altruism, enthusiasm, service, and hard work should be regarded as the worthy goal."

Every CP member should, as a true model Party member, respond enthusiastically to the above summons in the concrete deeds of his daily life.

A model CP member is also characterized by his strict, immutable viewpoint whenever revolutionary interests or issues which concern the nation and the people (are at stake). No threat nor bribe must shake him in his determination. Anyone who abandons his revolutionary and Party stand, disqualifies himself as a CP member.

There are in the history of the CCP many examples of members who fought for the cause of Communism unrelentingly in the face of every type of adversity and demonstrated their high devotion to the Party as well as to the revolution, under threats and temptations. Thousands and tens of thousands of sterling Party members and leaders have heroically sacrificed their lives at the fighting front, on the execution ground, and in prisons. They have demonstrated to the toiling masses of China and of the world the noble spirit of the sterling children of the Chinese race, and their glorious deeds will shine eternally. They are models for all revolutionaries. The members of our Party should not only revere them, but also follow in their footsteps.

6. Training and Study

Revolution is a stupendous and trying undertaking and the conditions of the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary movement are particularly complex and kaleidoscopic; the reason why the CP is able to control, under changing and complex circumstances, the great revolutionary movement and guide it towards victory is because it possesses a revolutionary ideology. Accordingly, a CP member must understand this revolutionary ideology; then he can find a way out of highly complex situations; he can work out his course in the ever-changing (revolutionary) movement, and can carry out his revolutionary assignments successfully. Unless he does so, he will lose his way and direction in the midst of his complicated and ever-changing revolutionary environment. He will be unable to work independently and will fail to carry out correctly the assignments and resolutions of the Party. Thus every CP member must learn through work whenever and wherever possible, elevate his political and cultural level, increase his revolutionary knowledge, and deepen his political vision.

In view of our current situation, what must we study?

(1) Our Party is a fighting Marxist-Leninist Party; we must study, above all, the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in order to train ourselves to become truly powerful CP members with distinct Party characteristics. (The purpose of) our study is to grasp the essence of Marxism-Leninism, and learn its viewpoint and method of approaching issues, while avoiding dogmatism.

(2) (We) must study the history and current political situation of China; otherwise we will be unable to formulate the tasks and methods of our present revolutionary work.

(3) (We) should study military affairs and technique, particularly guerrilla warfare. Today, "militarization of Party members" has become a fighting slogan for the entire Party.

(4) A Party member whose cultural level is low should before all else spend a lengthy period learning characters and reading books and newspapers to elevate his cultural level. Only the elevation of his cultural standard will make it possible for him to improve his political understanding.

(5) It is even more important, however, (for a CP member) to learn through practical work and (learn) from the masses whenever and wherever possible. The experiences and lessons acquired through practical work in the mass struggle are our best text-books.

Self-criticism is a most valuable instrument of learning for a CP member, and an acceptance of Party criticisms with humility is requisite to the progress of a Party member. A good Party member should accept and understand every criticism from the Party in a sincere and cheerful manner in order to correct his own errors.

Self-satisfaction or unwillingness to learn are the enemies of learning. We are opposed to the tendencies of "egotism" and "self-glorification" as well as to the lack of self-confidence and determination on the part of Party members in their learning. A CP member seldom has an opportunity to sit in a classroom for a lengthy period. It is thus necessary that he should squeeze out time from his busy schedule to study by himself. For this, a persevering spirit is essential.

Our slogan for CP members is "learn, learn, and learn again." The entire Party must respond enthusiastically to the slogan adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the CC: "For oneself, learn persistently; for others, instruct tirelessly!"

Only one who fills the above six qualifications deserves to be called a good CP member without soiling the great and glorious status of CP membership.

LIU SHAO-CH'I: ON THE TRAINING OF A COMMUNIST
PARTY MEMBER (August 7, 1939)

The Individual Interests of the CP Member are to be Subordinated Unconditionally to the Interests of the Party

A CP member must not only clearly determine his Communist philosophy of life and his world view, but must also explicitly determine the correct relationship between his individual interests and the interests of the Party. The Marxist principle is that the interests of the individual are subordinate to the interests of the Party, the interest of the part is subordinate to the interest of the whole, the short-range interest is subordinate to the long-range, and the national interest is subordinate to the international.

The CP is a political party representing the proletariat. The CP has no interest or aim aside from the interest of the liberation of the proletariat. However, the final liberation of the proletariat must also be the final liberation of all mankind. . . .

. . . Therefore, the individual interests of the Party member are subordinate to the interests of the Party, which means subordinate to the interests of class and national liberation, of Communism and of social progress.

The test of a CP member's loyalty to the Party and to the task of the revolution and Communism is his ability, regardless of the situation, to subordinate his individual interests unconditionally and absolutely to those of the Party. . . .

. . . [He] should see that his own individual interests are completely identical with Party interests, to the extent that they are fused. When conflicts arise between the interests of the Party and the individual, he can without the slightest hesitation or feeling of compulsion submit to Party interests and sacrifice individual [interests]. . . .

If there are only the interests and objectives of the Party and Communism in the Party member's ideology, if he has no independent, individual objectives separating him from the Party, nor any selfish calculations, if he is truly unselfish:

- (1) It is possible for him to possess excellent Communist moral virtues. . . .
- (2) It is possible for him to have the greatest courage. . . .
- (3) It is possible for him to excel in the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and methods, observe problems with quick penetration and recognize actuality. . . .
- (4) He can also be sincere, straightforward, and happy. . . .
- (5) It is also possible for him to have the greatest self-respect and self-esteem, and, under the over-all premise of the interests of the Party and revolution, he can be broad-minded, tolerant, and go out of his way to be of help to others, even, when necessary, enduring insults and ill-treatment without "feelings of resentment and hatred."

Comrades! The CP member should possess the greatest and noblest human virtues. At the same time he should adopt a strict and clear Party and proletarian standpoint (the Party and class spirit). Our moral stature is great precisely because it is proletarian and Communist. This moral stature is not built on a foundation which is reactionary and protects the interests of a few individuals and exploiters, but on the progressive foundation of proletarian interests and the interests of the final liberation of mankind, of the salvation of the world from oppression, and the building of a happy, beautiful Communist world. . . .

When necessary, "sacrificing one's own life to complete one's virtue" and "giving up life to attain righteousness" are considered the most natural thing by most CP members. . . .

The CP does not only represent the interests of each individual Party member, but also represents the long-range interests of all workers and the liberation of mankind. The Party interest is not merely the concentrated expression of the interests of individual Party members, but also of the interests of all workers and of mankind's liberation. . . .

The CP member has his individual interests and individual development, but at certain times contradictions can arise between these interests and the interests of the Party. At such times, it is demanded that the Party member unconditionally sacrifice his individual interests but not sacrifice the interests of the Party (no matter what the situation or pretext) to serve the individual. At the same time, the interests and development of the Party encompass the individual interests and development of the Party member. . . .

This is one aspect, one to which our individual Party members should turn their attention. But there is another aspect.

Although the general interests of the Party encompass the individual interests of the Party member, they cannot always completely encompass them and cannot and should not destroy the individuality of the Party member. The Party member is always faced with certain personal questions which he must attend to himself, and he must furthermore develop himself on the basis of his own individuality and specialties. Thus, in spheres where Party interests are not transgressed, the Party permits the Party member to establish his own individual and family life and to develop his individuality and specialties. In addition, the Party assists, under all possible conditions, the development of the individuality and specialties of the Party member (which are beneficial to the Party) and gives him suitable work and working conditions, as well as rewards, etc. When possible, the Party also looks after and protects the Party member's indispensable personal interests; for example, by giving him the opportunity for education and learning, curing him when sick and solving his family problems, and even sacrificing some Party work, when necessary, to protect its members. However, this is also for the interest of the whole Party because the Party's task cannot be accomplished if minimum living conditions, working and educational conditions for our comrades are not safeguarded, so that they will work with ease and enthusiasm. This is something to which responsible persons in the Party must turn their attention in dealing with the problems of Party members. This is another aspect of the general problem.

Examples of Erroneous Ideological Concepts Within the Party

What are the fundamentally incorrect ideological concepts which may be held by comrades in the Party? Without attempting to be systematic, I will cite the following:

First, people joining our Party not only come from the various classes of society, but have differing objectives and motives. Many members enter the CP to attain such great objectives as the realization of Communism and the liberation of the proletariat and mankind. Yet there are some who join the Party for other ulterior reasons and to attain other objectives. . . .

Second, certain Party members still retain an ideology of comparatively strong individualism and selfishness.

This individualism is expressed in the following ways: in resolving various concrete questions, certain persons put their individual interests first and the interests of the Party in a subordinate position, or worry about personal gain and loss and calculate their individual interests. Or they utilize public means to gain personal advantage, relying on Party work to attain certain personal objectives. . . .

This selfish individualism is often expressed in unprincipled disputes in the Party and in the errors of clique struggle, sectarianism, and particularism. It is also expressed in actions which willfully damage and show disrespect for Party discipline. . . .

The particularism which exists in the Party differs from this individualism. It arises most often when comrades only see the interests of their particular unit, see their own part of a job but not the whole, and fail to see the work done by another unit. . . .

Third, vainglory, individual heroism, exhibitionism, etc., still persist to a greater or lesser degree in the concepts of not a few comrades. . . .

Comrades! The CP member must not be self-satisfied and proud as an individual. . . .

. . . We are opposed to individual heroics and exhibitionism, but not to the Party members' desiring progress, for this is the CP member's most precious quality. But a progressive attitude which is proletarian and Communist and one which is individualistic are two different things. The former searches for truth, upholds the truth, and fights most effectively for the truth; it is characterized by its unlimited future for advancement and progressiveness. The latter, even for the individual, is of an extremely limited nature in progressiveness and has no future. . . .

Of course--and I reiterate here--in assigning work to Party members, Party leaders should pay attention to the differing circumstances of individual Party members, assign them work suitable to their individuality, play up their strong points, and encourage their enthusiasm for progress. However, a Party member cannot take this as a reason for refusing to accept the work assigned to him by the Party.

Fourth, there are some in the Party who strongly reflect the ideological concepts of the exploiting classes and often use methods meant to be used against the enemy in dealing with comrades and in dealing with intra-Party problems. They completely lack the great devoted and sincere Communist, proletarian spirit of mutual assistance and solidarity. . . .

They obviously reflect the concept of the exploiting classes in decay, because all exploiters, in order to develop their own position, are bound to harm others. The capitalists want to enlarge their own property or avoid bankruptcy in time of economic crisis, and they must trample on many lesser capitalists and cause countless workers to starve. The landlords want to develop their own position, and they must exploit the peasants and cause many to lose their land. . . .

Fifth, bureaucratism still exists in our Party and in various organizations (I shall, if the opportunity arises, discuss this problem later). Some individual comrades are still "petty-minded," find fault with small details and do not recognize the larger issues, and so on. They do not possess the noble spirit and vision of Communism and cannot see the over-all situation, but they are intensely interested in the trivial things before their noses. . . .

In addition, the rashness and wavering of the petty bourgeoisie and the destructiveness of the lumpenproletariat and bankrupt peasants are also reflected in the concepts of some comrades, but we will not enumerate them here. In short, within our Party, not only the Communist ideology, which represents the great and determined proletariat, is reflected, but some comrades reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, non-proletarian ideologies and even the ideologies of the decaying exploiting classes. Sometimes these ideologies are concealed and only expressed in minor individual, everyday problems,

and sometimes they develop and systematically show themselves in various questions of principle, in important political questions, and in the intra-Party struggle. . . .

Sources of Various Erroneous Ideological Concepts in the Party

Why do these undesirable things still exist in our enlightened Party? I believe that the reason is very simple. Our Party did not materialize out of thin air, but was produced in reality from Chinese society. Although our Party members are generally fine Chinese men and women and the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat, they still come from all parts of Chinese society, and still live in present-day society. This contemporary Chinese society is still filled with the influences of the exploiters, with selfishness and self-interest, hidden scheming, bureaucratism, and other evils. We have many good Party members who are not easily influenced by these things, but some Party members bring with them, or reflect, in our Party the evils of society. Is there anything strange about this? (It is) just like finding mud on the body of one who creeps out of the mire and who often has to stay in the mire. Is there anything strange about that? This is not strange, but unavoidable. On the contrary, it would be strange if these evils did not exist in the CCP. How could an evil society produce a CP completely devoid of evils? . . .

Thus, in the struggles within and outside the Party, we reform society and gradually eradicate all that is dark and backward in society, and at the same time we reform our Party and Party members, resolve the contradictions in the Party, and make our Party members healthy and strong. . . .

The Intra-Party Struggle and Attitudes Towards Erroneous Ideological Concepts in the Party

Because of the influence of the exploiting classes, the complexity of elements in the working class, and because of the complexity of elements in our Party today, ideological differences, as well as differences in viewpoint, habit, taste, and feeling have arisen among individual members of our Party. . . .

Thus, the crux of the problem is not the existence of differing ideological concepts within the Party nor the existence of divergencies in opinion, though these certainly exist. The crux of the problem is the manner in which the contradictions within the Party are to be resolved, how did these divergencies come into existence, and (the manner in which) incorrect and non-proletarian ideological concepts are to be overcome. Obviously, these contradictions can be resolved, divergencies overcome, and incorrect and non-proletarian concepts defeated only through intra-Party struggle. As Engels said: "Contradictions can never be concealed for long by anyone at any time, they must be resolved through struggle. . . ."

The first attitude is to rejoice at the defects, errors, and undesirable characteristics of our Party. . . .

The second attitude is to tolerate, accept, and learn certain erroneous thoughts and (follow) bad examples in order to satisfy personal schemes and desires. . . .

The third attitude is to be unconcerned with the defects, errors, and the various unhealthy phenomena in the Party and allow them to develop freely. . . .

The fourth attitude is that of deep hatred for those who exhibit these errors, defects, and those with incorrect concepts. . . .

The fifth attitude is the one which we should adopt. It is in contradiction to the four attitudes listed above. (1) We must first recognize and differentiate the various phenomena, ideological concepts, diverging opinions and proposals within the Party, asking ourselves which are correct and beneficial to the long-range interests of the Party and the revolution, and which are incorrect and harmful to the long-range interests of the Party and revolution; or (whether) both sides of an argument are wrong and a third view or proposal is correct. After level-headed discernment and examination, we should decide on a clear attitude of our own and take our stand on the correct side. We should not follow blindly or worship idols. (2) We should learn, promote, and extol all good models of conduct and correct spirit in the Party, support all correct proposals and opinions, and not follow bad examples nor allow ourselves to be influenced by incorrect ideological concepts. (3) We should not adopt the point of view of liberalism, but should struggle uncompromisingly with ideas and proposals which are erroneous in principle and with all evil phenomena in the Party, so that these errors

and phenomena can be continuously overcome. [We] should not let things get out of hand and permit these errors and evil phenomena to develop and harm Party interests, nor should we be afraid of this kind of intra-Party struggle. (4) However, an attitude which is neither mechanical nor categorical, combines an uncompromising definiteness in principle and lively forms and methods of struggle with a spirit of tolerance and persuasion, and in the long-range struggle, educates, criticizes, conditions, and reforms those comrades whose thought is not incurably erroneous. Those with this attitude concretely and appropriately promote the necessary thought struggle in the Party on all questions of principle at all times, but do not struggle wildly in the Party, in a manner which is subjective, mechanical, and psychopathic, nor are they fond of struggling. (5) In the intra-Party struggle [we should] consolidate the Party, strengthen Party discipline and authority, mete out organizational punishment to those elements within the Party which have proved incurable, even expelling them from the Party, and in this manner [we] achieve health and consolidation for the Party. This is the attitude which all good, progressive Party members should adopt. Of the five attitudes above, only the fifth is a correct, bolshevik attitude . . . we often fail to carry out self-criticism formally, earnestly, and with a true sense of responsibility; (we often) fail to expose the various errors, defects, and all desirable phenomena in the Party, and correct and eliminate them. Criticism from the bottom up is especially deficient, and we must develop greatly in this respect. However, there is a considerable amount of irresponsible, irregular, and cowardly criticism and expression of dissatisfaction concerning this or that individual, this or that event, as well as considerable behind-the-back discussion and chit-chat in the Party. . . .

Self-criticism is necessary to us not for the destruction of [Party] authority, the destruction of Party discipline, or the weakening of Party leadership, but for the enhancement of Party authority, the reinforcement of Party discipline, and the strengthening of the Party's leadership. . . .

. . . Fundamentally, it is in the struggle against various dark forces within and without the Party that we reform the world and mankind, and at the same time reform our Party and ourselves. The intra-Party struggle is a reflection of the class struggle outside the Party. In the class struggle outside the Party--in the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses--the Party is tempered, developed, and strengthened; at the same time, the Party achieves consolidation and unity in the intra-Party struggle and gives planned, correct, powerful leadership to the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses. It is therefore fundamentally incorrect and of benefit to the enemy to adopt the attitude of liberalism towards various errors, defects, and undesirable phenomena in the Party, to attempt to blot out divergencies in principle in the Party, to evade the intra-Party struggle, to conceal the Party's internal contradictions or to exhibit negligence; because they are in contradiction to the rules of development of the class struggle and to our basic viewpoint of reforming the world and mankind through struggle. It is therefore also incorrect to separate the intra-Party struggle from the class struggle outside the Party--from the revolutionary movement of the broad masses--and transform it into empty talk; because the Party cannot be tempered, developed, or strengthened if it is separated from the revolutionary struggle of the broad masses. Yet it is also incorrect to carry things to the other extreme and adopt a categorical attitude towards all comrades who have errors or defects (which are) not incurable, to carry on the intra-Party struggle mechanically, or to subjectively manufacture intra-Party struggles within the Party. Because this is also injurious to the Party, it gives the enemy an opportunity to mount an attack on our Party. This also runs completely counter to the rules of the Party's development. Loyal comrades in the Party who have committed errors should not be utterly denounced from the start; instead they should be persuaded, educated, and tempered with a friendly, sympathetic attitude, and only when absolutely necessary should they be publicly attacked and expelled. Of course, we cannot allow anyone to harm the Party's interests, and we must take precautions lest opportunists, spies, Trotskyites, and two-faced elements take advantage of every opportunity to harm the Party's interests. . . .

. . . We should not ourselves speak thoughtlessly to harm other comrades, but should endure the words of others which harm us. . . .

In general, our ideological training is our fundamental training to become loyal, pure, progressive, model Party members and cadres. We should: (1) from the learning of Marxism-Leninism and the actuality of the revolution, establish our own Communist philosophy of life and world view, establish our own determined Party and class stand. (2) On the basis of Communism's philosophy of life and world view, and a determined Party standpoint, examine all of our own thoughts and actions, correct all our incorrect thoughts, and at the same time observe problems as well as other comrades from this position. (3) Make constant use of appropriate forms and attitudes in struggling with the various

incorrect ideological concepts in the Party, especially the ideologies influencing the present revolutionary struggle. (4) Hold ourselves strictly in check in thought, speech, and action; primarily by the adoption of strict standpoints and principles in regulating (ourselves) in political thought, speech, and action which are related to the present revolutionary struggle. In this regard, even petty matters (such as individual life and attitude) deserve our attention. But aside from questions of principle and vital political questions, we should not be excessively strict with our comrades, and should not meticulously find fault with them in petty matters.

Comrades! In brief, this is the fundamental ideological training of the Party member.

III. Indoctrination of Cadres

III. Indoctrination of Cadres

This article is presented here as it appears in Chapter III of Richard Walker's China Under Communism: The First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, under the title of Psychological Control. The description of the cadre training process which follows is based on 1) interviews with 17 refugees who had actually been through the process (conducted in Hong Kong during the summer of 1952); 2) a general survey of Western and Chinese literature on the subject; and 3) a study of CCP documents.

The cadres of the Party are the nucleus of the party leadership and of the Chinese revolution. Everyone knows that "cadres decide everything." . . . They are, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung puts it, "the treasures of the nation and pride of the whole Party."

Liu Shao-ch'i, 1945

To consolidate power and keep their vast political machine in operation in a country as large and populous as China the Communist leaders require a tightly knit and loyal group of subordinates. The party by nature of its structure and ideology requires also that these lower level leaders be devoted and unquestioning enthusiasts. Developing such militant bearers of the party doctrine in China, a country where tradition has always been strong, has been no small task. Communist achievements in the last five years, at least in the field of political control, testify to the success with which it has been accomplished.

The membership of the Chinese Communist party has grown very rapidly since the end of World War II, in spite of an almost continual state of purge to weed out undesirable elements.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Party Membership</u>
1937	40,000
1945	1,200,000
1948	3,000,000
1950	5,000,000
1951	5,800,000
1953	6,000,000
1954	6,500,000

Bringing all the new party members, as well as others serving in the bureaucracy, into a pattern of conformity and discipline required intense indoctrination and involved changing thought patterns and social habits on an unprecedented scale. The growth in party membership figures between 1945 and 1948 indicates the Communists had already tackled the problem of creating cadres before their army overran China, and helps to explain the disciplined success of the Communist forces when they engulfed the mainland in 1949.

As used by the rulers of China the term cadre (kan-pu), which is applied to individuals as well as groups, does not necessarily mean a member of the Communist party, although at most of the lower levels all party members are referred to as cadres. Walter Gourelay defines a cadre as "an 'activist,' a dynamic element, who serves as the transmission belt between the party, the state, and the masses. He may be the leader of a group, or merely a rank-and-file member, but he is at all times connected with the activity of the party and expresses the point of view of the party." The method for creating cadres stems from training techniques developed by the Communist party of the Soviet Union and is being applied everywhere in the Communist orbit today--from Romania and East Germany to the jungles of Malaya and the battle-scarred towns of North Korea.

At the level of creating cadres the Communists have arrived at a system of conversion and changing of thought patterns which in many ways constitutes a new dimension of power in the world today. It is of course possible to overestimate the effectiveness of this system, but the development of psychological control techniques has contributed far more to the thoroughness and success of the Communist regime in unifying China than has been apparent in accounts published in the West. The feats of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues were accomplished not so much by force of arms as through a superiority in disciplined organization. It is necessary therefore to examine closely the process as well as the tools involved in mass control in China.

This new dimension of political power which has been applied in China and which is probably best described by the phrase psychological mass coercion is not a simple process which can be isolated and analyzed by the traditional methods of the social and political scientist in the West. It is not only a system of political authority and social control; it is a method of linking all aspects of life in a Communist state. For example, psychological mass coercion links internal security with education and is at the same time a part of both of these systems.

There are many reasons for the rather widespread failure to describe the Communist rule in China in terms of such a method of control. Our methodological tools are not as yet sufficiently developed to analyze such a phenomenon. There is a general lack of appreciation of its importance, and tendency to dismiss it as sensationalism or an ephemeral development. And finally this process of control involves an attack upon the human mind, a subject unpleasant to the West, where tradition and religion affirm that the human mind is sacred and therefore cannot be regimented or controlled. Most of the literature to date has been descriptive and journalistic. The only start at analysis, Brain-washing in Red China by Edward Hunter, is still dismissed in some academic circles as mostly fiction.

Brain-washing or hsi-nao is the phrase which the Chinese have applied to the most thorough aspect of psychological mass coercion: that part which focuses with intensity on the individual. Actually the loose use of the term has tended to prevent differentiation among four separate processes: 1) creating cadres, 2) converting enemies, 3) controlling masses, and 4) extracting confessions. Although all of these are a part of the control pattern, and although all blend into one another and share many techniques in common, they must be carefully separated in any attempt to understand the psychological control pattern in China today.

Certainly the creation of the cadres is the most important part of psychological mass coercion. To date, however, most of the attention of the West has been centered on the attempts by the Chinese Communists to convert or extract confessions from the rather sophisticated products of Western civilization among their prisoners in Korea. The significant fact that there were thousands of dedicated cadres who dealt with United Nations troops in Korea, who were fanatically devoted to their tasks of converting or extracting confessions, and further who felt that they would succeed, is all too frequently overlooked.

People's China, the English language propaganda magazine of the Chinese Communists, has explained clearly what the Communist high command was attempting to do with its trainees in the first year of the regime:

The breath-taking rate at which the People's Liberation Army freed China's mainland led to many new problems. One of the most urgent was the problem of sufficient cadres to introduce the policies of the people's government in the newly liberated regions and to mobilize the population for all-out production.

The government has adopted the principle of making the greatest possible use of students, government personnel and other intellectuals of the old society. But the minds of such people are thickly encrusted with the ideology of the feudal gentry and the bourgeoisie. And as long as these people retain the viewpoint of the former ruling classes, they cannot adequately carry out the program of the new government, which is based on the interests of the laboring classes.

This problem was met by setting up people's revolutionary colleges in all newly liberated sectors of the country. These educational centers specialize exclusively in transforming old-type

students and intellectuals into the new-type of cadre willing to place all of his talent and energy at the service of the people. Utilizing the experiences of earlier political retraining schools in the Old Liberated Areas, these colleges now carry out their task so efficiently that the great bulk of their students have virtually become new people at the end of a six-month course.

The cadre training process has been applied in China with great flexibility, and its quality and effectiveness have been uneven. In some cases it has involved only part-time study; sometimes courses last for more than two years. In general, however, it is the most effective type of brain-washing and has been carried out by schools like the North China People's Revolutionary College near Peking, which by March 1950 had trained more than 18,000 cadres. Over 200,000 cadres had been trained in such schools by that time. Minister of Personnel An Tzu-wen stated on the third anniversary of the regime that the number of cadres had reached 2,750,000, about four times the number in 1949.

Much of the process of cadre training owes its origins to Moscow training schools for Chinese Communists, which have been in operation at least since 1920. One such school, expressly devoted to the training of young cadres, has not been mentioned in Western literature to any great extent. It has been graduating almost 500 a year since 1931, including the war years. Throughout the war carefully selected young Chinese, sent from the Communist areas of China to the many Moscow schools, learned in them some of the basic psychological techniques of mutual spying and group responsibility.

The really important development in cadre training in China took place during the war, as part of the Party Reform Movement of 1942-44. It was at this time that Liu Shao-ch'i came into his own as chief deviser of the party's indoctrination program and brain-washing methods. Liu was a discipline specialist, and during the Party Reform Campaign he managed to introduce Soviet psychological techniques on a mass basis. As Boyd Compton points out, the "purpose was the type of intensive indoctrination and training which would allow the party to operate with unanimity in a situation where close administrative control and inspection were out of the question." In this period the works of the Soviet Communists of the Stalin era made an indelible impact on the Chinese Communist party. By the postwar period, twelve of the thirteen books of required reading for cadres were Chinese translations of Russian books.

The Party Reform Movement of 1942-44 was the first of the great drives of the Chinese Communist party which have now become one of their methods of governing. The Soviets had already contributed their organizational techniques. During this wartime Party Reform Movement Mao Tse-tung turned to Stalin's version of Marxism for his basic concepts and methods. This "organized indoctrination by means of criticism, self-criticism, discussion, and the continual study of selected Marxist writings" aimed at "steeling" the cadres to all sorts of violence and hardship and at the same time making the complete obedience of each one a spontaneous move. The process is one which Liu Shao-ch'i labeled "self-cultivation."

Liu could draw on many aspects of the Chinese tradition for such a phrase as this, and the meaning behind it. This was the expression which the Chinese philosopher Hsün-tzu had used in developing a doctrine which in part underlay an almost equally totalitarian state two thousand years before. Liu quoted Confucius to the trainees in answering the question "Why Must Communist Party Members Undertake Self-cultivation?" "Confucius said: At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decree of Heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow my heart's desire, without transgressing what was right." The goal was to make obedience to the will of the party so natural and automatic that it would at all times be the heart's desire of the trainee.

Here is where Confucius, Liu Shao-ch'i, and the Russian physiologist Pavlov are all blended into one. Pavlov held that man integrates impressions from his environment into his reflexes. This seemed to fit ideally with the Communist conviction of economic environmental determination. Thus, by an extension of Pavlov's theories, when they prevailed over those of voluntarism in the USSR, Soviet psychologists have held that given the proper conditioning the human being could be turned into the ideal new Soviet man. Pavlovian psychology holds that the human physique cannot resist the

conditioning, and Soviet scientists have since been attempting to perfect Pavlovian techniques so that any focus of resistance in the individual can be overcome. All of this is not too far from the final phrase in the Confucian saying quoted by Liu or from the situation in China where in the course of many centuries the formal ceremonials imposed by the Confucian ideology had become almost automatic reflexes to the Chinese. Of course the big difference is in the underlying philosophy, which for Confucianism is eminently humanistic.

The basic element in conditioning in Soviet discipline is the process of criticism and self-criticism. That is the "key weapon" in the cadre training procedure. When Mao Tse-tung listed the assets of the Communist party in China in On People's Democratic Dictatorship, he put this before the army or the united front: "a disciplined party armed with the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, employing the method of self-criticism and closely linked with the masses." Criticism and self-criticism constitute in effect an open method of mutual spying and form the basis for the emulation campaigns and the volunteering. They are responsible for much of the grim fear and lack of humor which are a part of China today. People's China says about them:

It is not easy for old-type intellectuals, particularly those from feudal backgrounds, to learn to use this essential weapon for self-improvement in a correct manner. At first there is often the liberal tendency to spare the feelings of one's fellow-students by softening one's criticisms. Some students take criticism meetings as an occasion for attacking others in a non-constructive and uncomradely manner. Still others tend to rattle off a lot of "leftist" sounding phrases and thus ward off any real analysis of their own short-comings. However, in a remarkably short time, most students have learned to apply criticism and self-criticism in the correct spirit of seeking the truth, recognizing both merits and defects with equal frankness in order to encourage the one and eradicate the other. It is in this way that the students are gradually able to raise their political level.

The intense application of the experiences gained during the war has been continued in a never-ending schooling of the cadres. The revolutionary universities set up in 1949 for the rapid brain-washing of tens of thousands of young Chinese were dissolved in 1953. In their place the formal school system of the country carries on the function of cadre training. Here the most interesting development has been the opening of the new building of the People's University on 4 October 1953, in the Western Hills outside Peking. This high-level school in Marxism for Chinese Communist party cadres was organized and its curriculum laid down in toto by a group of Soviet advisers. Here, as in all the cadre training centers and small discussion groups, learning Communist theory and memorizing long passages of Marxist phraseology constitute the main task.

But the import of psychological mass coercion does not really become clear until we examine the details of what is involved in creating a cadre for the party. Here the Chinese Reds have undoubtedly made some new contributions to the methods they learned from the Soviet "big brothers."

For creating cadres, the Communists approach humans with a manipulative attitude. The trainees constitute just so many bodies to be transformed into parts of the organizational structure which will function automatically yet with enthusiasm and almost fanatic devotion to the cause of the party. It is probably because of the Communist demand for fanaticism that most of the trainees are youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.

The training process usually lasts from nine to twelve months--in some cases more, in others less. Although there is wide variation depending on the intellectual level of the trainees, the same general program is used for all. The Communist leaders prefer young people who have had at least one year of middle school. After they took over the mainland they concentrated heavily on this group, skipping over their former source of numerical strength, the illiterate peasant youngsters.

Throughout the training at least six factors are kept constant. First, the training takes place within a controlled area or camp. The only reason the trainees leave the reservation is for conducted "field trips." Ties with former friends and family are severed almost completely. A second constant factor is fatigue. Students are subjected to a schedule which maintains physical and mental fatigue throughout the training. There is no opportunity for relaxation or reflection; they are occupied with memorizing great amounts of theoretical material and are expected to employ the new terminology

with facility. Coupled with the fatigue is a third constant: tension. This comes not only from knowing a complete break is being made with the past but also from not being able to keep up with the work assigned. In numberless classes and through long hours of reading and discussion sections the trainee must force himself to stay alert or be prepared to face serious consequences.

Uncertainty is a fourth factor throughout the process. Almost immediately the prospective cadre finds himself isolated from his fellows by a feeling of uncertainty. He is never sure whether he is behaving properly, whether he may be whisked away to the fate which awaits unsuccessful trainees, whether he is going to be denounced by one of his associates. Trainees who conspicuously fail to comprehend the camp pattern in the first few weeks disappear overnight, and there is usually a well-sown rumor concerning their fate. One refugee reported: "I found out later that my friend Liang who had disappeared from the camp one night during the second month of training had been sent to one of the labor battalions, where he almost died. He has returned home now and is still so weak that he stays home in bed."

A fifth constant factor is the use of vicious language. The future cadre learns almost immediately that vocabulary is divided into glowing words reserved for the "new" pattern of life and invectives which are to be applied to all phases of his previous life. The final factor is the seriousness attached to the whole process. Humor is forbidden and consigned to the "decadent and rotten values of the old society."

The training process, whether carried on in the revolutionary colleges, in training centers for captured Nationalist soldiers, or in the formal universities, also employs a set of common techniques. There are first of all the small discussion groups of about ten or twelve into which all trainees (and for that matter most of the people in the country) are divided. In the camps the future revolutionaries stay in the same group throughout the entire training process. They have not known the other members of their group previously. It is within these small groups that the really intense part of the training takes place. As one young Chinese woman points out:

The purposes of these small groups were explained as follows: "To make our fellow students better accustomed to collective life, to give them more opportunities to inspire and encourage one another, to render their lives fuller and more significant." But the most important purpose was left untold: To make the students form a network of espionage so that they may watch one another, and to breed a spirit of espionage, and to teach spying techniques in a totalitarian state.

Each of the small groups has one informer planted in its midst. Most trainees are aware that the spy is there, but they are usually unable to identify him. The small group is led through its training by a deeply devoted and already well trained cadre. The major work of the small groups is criticism, self-criticism, and discussion of training materials. Here the trainee first learns the technique of the "struggle meeting," the term the Chinese apply to group meetings at which members accuse each other, sins are confessed, and the values of the "old society" are destroyed in the process of "struggle."

Next there are the large group meetings, in which an entire training class within the revolutionary school gathers relatively frequently to hear long lectures by high-ranking party officials. These are then discussed in the small groups and all trainees are held responsible for details of their contents. It was before such large group meetings that Liu Shao-ch'i delivered the series of lectures which were later published as books: How to Be a Good Communist, On Intra-party Struggle, On the Party, etc. The large groups also hear model confessions and criticisms, examine group progress, and witness demonstrations. One ex-trainee in Hong Kong in the summer of 1952 described a trip by the whole school to a nearby village to watch and participate in the beating to death of an old woman "landlord" who was hung up by her wrists before a mob of over a thousand people.

A third training technique is the required writing of autobiographies and diaries, which are exposed to the glare of group criticism and continuously revised and rewritten. A former trainee explains: "A straight narration of your past life was not enough. For every action you described you had to give its motive in detail. Your awakened criticism had to be apparent in every sentence. You had to say why you smoked, why you drank, why you had had social connections with certain people-- why, why, why." This technique of autobiographies and diaries was employed on United Nations troops

in Korean prison compounds. The thousands of Japanese who returned to Japan in 1953 and 1954 had also been subjected to it.

The autobiographies or diaries are mostly confined to ideological life histories and constitute a process of deep self-analysis. Required content includes "principle," "stand," criticism of family and friends, class self-analysis, and correct "content." They are read in the small groups and sometimes in the large groups, and then criticized. After being rewritten many times in line with the criticisms, they become a part of the dossier of the trainee. His soul becomes public property.

Through the technique of questioning, trainees are forced to participate in discussion. There is no remaining outside of the program; no trainee dares to remain silent. If he does not take part in correcting his fellows, he is not alert; if he does not engage in self-criticism, he is not learning properly and is subject to "reassignment." Students as well as instructors participate in constant questioning of each other, with such queries as: "Did I see you gazing around instead of paying attention at the lecture?" "You did not seem to sleep peacefully last night; was there something on your mind?"

A fifth technique utilized during training is that of "volunteering." Throughout the period the trainees participate in emulation campaigns. One small group challenges another by volunteering to devote an extra hour to studying. Soon everyone in the camp is studying the extra hour in order not to be "backward" or ungrateful to Chairman Mao for the opportunity to study his great works. The emulation campaigns always serve to make the work load harder and the training more intense and thorough. Another aspect of this is volunteering signatures to petitions, declarations, and other documents which carry with them deep involvement.

A final important technique, which stems from the others, is the isolation of the individual. Doubts and fears create an inner battle which the individual must fight for himself. Thus an end result of the training is the seemingly paradoxical isolation of the individual at the same time that he is losing his individuality to the group.

All of the training techniques and their effectiveness depend in large measure upon the ideology of the training period. The ideology is, of course, Marxism and Mao. The trainees are made aware that their training and future career have been planned and forecast under the superior dialectic of Marx as interpreted by Stalin, Mao, and, since 1953, the collective leadership. The Organization is infallible because it has a monopoly of the correct interpretation of Communist dogma as well as of history.

One of the key ideologists in the cadre training process is the popularizer of Marxism in China, Ai Ssu-ch'i, whose name is not too well known outside of China, but whose relatively simple books have been very effective in explaining Marxism to the Chinese. Ai Ssu-chi's is the founder and editor of Hsüeh-hsi (Study), the magazine which guides the ideological lives of the cadres and is one of the leading journals in China today.

Ai Ssu-chi's contributions to "thought changing" and to the popularization of Marxism for the Chinese masses have been neatly summarized by Walter Gourlay:

"Philosophy," wrote Ai, "consists not only of the ability to speak pretty words, it must also be able to lead us to activity." The correct philosophy is therefore the one which enables us to engage in constructive activity. Since there is only one correct philosophy, it follows that there can be no constructive activity unless one accepts this philosophy. It is worth noting that this line of reasoning leads directly to the conclusion that the Communist party, which alone possesses the correct philosophy, is alone capable of engaging in the correct activity, and that those who do not accept the party's philosophy are, ipso facto, engaged in incorrect activity.

Since constructive activity is socially desirable, it follows that acceptance of Communist philosophy becomes an ethical question. Here, in embryo form, is the concept later used in the hsüeh-hsi movement, that acceptance of Marxist theories would lead to greater happiness in one's personal life.

The key doctrines of Marxism necessary for understanding its role in China are contained in the series of required readings for cadres which Ai has helped to interpret. These originally included The Communist Manifesto, Socialism--Utopian and Scientific, Imperialism--the Highest Stage of Capitalism,

Foundations of Leninism, The History of Social Development, Leontiev's Political Economy, and The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik). The list is constantly being added to and revised.

Stalinist Marxism then is the major ingredient of the themes which are stressed during the training period. Ai Ssu-ch'i maintains that the rank and file of the people do not have to be concerned with subtleties of Communist ideology--they can leave these for the bigwigs of the party. He maintains that the bulk of the population need to know but three basic theories in order to adopt the correct mental attitudes, namely: 1) labor created the world, 2) class struggle, and 3) the Marxist theory of the state. These three theories are indeed the background for the training.

The first theme stressed in the revolutionary schools is the unimportance of the individual. By himself he is nothing. He amounts to something only when he is united in spirit with the masses and expresses himself through mass action. Many projects are designed to demonstrate to the trainee in the course of camp life that as an individual he is powerless, that only as part of an organization whose discipline he accepts does he come to have strength. Another theme linked to this is the power and force of the Organization--that is, the state led by the party. This is stressed both positively and negatively. Positively the trainee is made acutely aware how effective and efficient the Organization is. An abstraction, and intangible, it yet has immediate meaning for everyone in the camp. The Organization orders this and plans that. Negatively the Organization places limits upon the actions and ambitions of the trainees, who soon learn to conform.

A third theme stressed is old versus new. All of the vocabulary and indoctrination are set up to make a clear distinction between the two. The past life of the students is dark, feudal, corrupt, degenerate, etc.; everything about the party and the country under the party's rule is bright, progressive, cooperative, democratic, and moral. Of course patriotism, a fourth theme, is brought in. Nationalistic overtones can be discovered in all the speeches. The coupling of the ideology of the party with the party's rule of the land makes it possible to regard any negative attitude as treason. The training itself is viewed as a method for reviving the spirit of the ancestral land and setting it in motion along the right path after centuries of "feudal betrayal." The theme of service to country makes the training much more palatable to some of the most cynical of the revolutionary students.

The power of the Chinese Communist party and its sweeping victory over China make the fifth theme--inevitability--easy for the trainee to accept. The cadres in charge of the camp insist that there is no sense in holding back; the party will win in any task it undertakes, whether it concerns an individual, a group, or an external enemy. Trainees are told to confess their reactionary thoughts in self-criticism sessions, for the party will inevitably find them out.

Of course, the theme of class consciousness and class struggle is an essential ingredient of the ideological training. Every trainee is expected to have examined closely his own and his associates' class backgrounds. He is expected to develop the habit of assessing the class status of everyone he encounters. Since in Marxian theory all history is the history of class struggle and the trainee is to represent the side of the final victor in this long historical process, he is expected to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy, to know whom to hate and whom to love. There is no middle ground, and clear lines must be drawn in dealing with others. Trainees must express hate and contempt for the enemies of the Organization, who are their enemies. They must love Mao and their comrades. The more enthusiastic the extremes of hate and love, the clearer the class consciousness. Neutralism thus becomes a contemptible position. An important part of cadre training involves explaining whom to hate and for what reasons and whom to love and for what reasons. Each trainee must by the end of his course be able to identify friends and enemies and to explain his reasons in proper terminology.

From class struggle the theme of "steeling" naturally follows. In order to hasten the inevitable victory the trainees must "steel" themselves so as to be able to fight their class and national enemies without showing such bourgeois emotions as pity and sympathy. They must steel themselves in order to be able to participate in struggle meetings and to denounce and execute others. Steeling involves the ability to dispense with conscience. Sentiments, emotions, esthetics, love--all must be subordinated to the battle conducted by the Organization. Even romance is consigned to the dated values of the "old society." Liu Shaw-tong reports that one of the trainees was told:

"Our dealings with female lovers are exactly the same as our dealings with any other comrade, with the exception of the sex act. Our lovers are first comrades, then lovers. Any extra emotions or private affections are really subversive, because then the temptation to place the Revolution on a secondary level of importance becomes too great to be resisted. It is undisciplinatory to forsake the concept of the classes even for a moment, and we must always strengthen the propertyless-class standpoint, cultivate the correct working attitude, and nourish our good antiliberal ways. The correct view of love must ever conform to a positive thought standard and the proper political recognition that the Organization comes first in all matters."

With this background in mind, let us turn to the actual training process itself. As pointed out above, the amount of time involved, of course, varies from camp to camp and also depends upon the character of the trainees and the purposes for which they are being trained. Those who are marked as potential high-level cadres train longer hours and for a longer period. The training for those whose major work will be in metropolitan and more sophisticated centers is longer. Actually a course is continuous, the stages blending into each other, but for the purposes of analysis the cadre training at the revolutionary colleges divides conveniently into five stages.

The first stage is physical control, which begins the minute the trainees have been recruited. Major methods for recruiting trainees, both male and female, are calling for volunteers from regular educational institutions, recommendations from party members who have observed the candidates in their home atmosphere, and local pressure exerted through unemployment agencies, etc.

Immediately after shipment to training schools, cadre candidates become aware that there is no retreat. At least one case of punishment for attempted escape is brought to the attention of the class before the end of the first week. Physical restriction is imposed "voluntarily" at the suggestion of the hidden party members who are planted among the trainees and who agitate for enthusiastic volunteering of services so that the training will be more effective. Trainees are immediately divided into the small groups, led by a training activist assigned to them as soon as they are formed.

This period of physical control lasts about two months. During this time the trainees are allotted all sorts of physical tasks, often of a demeaning nature, connected with the housekeeping of the camp. Long hours of physical exercise combined with propaganda are designed to show the trainee the meaning of the tasks of proletariat and peasants at first hand, so that he can appreciate why the revolution is being carried on for the people who do and who understand this type of work. Grandiose physical labor projects demonstrate the importance of group effort for real achievement. The parallel is drawn between camp problems and the national problems which the cadres will face.

During this period of physical exhaustion, training themes are designed to instill a maximum of disillusionment in the mind of the trainee. He is disillusioned with his past; he is disillusioned with his training. Disillusionment with the training allows respect for the whole procedure to be built up gradually; respect for former social values is never revived.

Although physical tasks constitute at least two-thirds of the load during this stage, the other third is regarded as far more important. It is during this time that the pattern for the next stage is established. The small groups meet once a day for at least two hours for purposes of "study." Initial study is devoted to analysis of each trainee's background, his ideas, his family, past friends, ideals, and so on. This gives the leader and the secretly planted cadre opportunity to become intimately acquainted with each member of their group and to note weak spots for later exploitation. Criticism and self-criticism play an important role; there is competition to determine which recruit can be most successful in uncovering the mistakes of his past. Initial criticisms come as a shock to many who find their parents and deep personal values attacked as "feudal," "reactionary," "selfish," etc. The one who can pry deeply into the background of his fellows is quickly marked as a good prospect. Even during this initial stage some of these are withdrawn to be assigned to a more specialized and intensive program which lasts almost a year with six working days from 5:00 A.M. to 11:30 P.M.

Although the lives and backgrounds of the trainees constitute the main subject matter of this first stage, much attention is given to camp behavior. Each is expected to observe and criticize the conduct of his associates. If he cannot find items for criticism--such as relaxing on a work detail

or showing too little enthusiasm--he in turn is criticized for not showing sufficient concern for the members of his group who are presumably anxious for his aid.

During this stage there are one or two large group meetings each week, devoted either to a long lecture in Communist theory or to confessions. Here specially selected trainees bare their past sins as examples for the several hundred in the audience. They know that they dare not hold anything back from the assembled throng, for their small group has already heard the full confession.

Food and accommodations are especially poor in this stage. Trainees are told they must come to appreciate the position of the "propertyless classes" in order to understand the necessary violence of the class struggle.

The main achievement of this first stage from the point of view of the party is teaching the value of mutual spying. All must be convinced that the new society rewards those who feel concern for the "ideological lives" of their associates. Pointing out errors of one's fellows is the type of duty required everywhere in the "people's state." Sometime during the initial stage of training the individual becomes aware that he can have no secrets. His life and his thoughts are to be public property. If, for example, he is morose or worried, he knows that the fact will be brought out in his group and he will be obliged to state the reason.

After about two months of physical control, the camp authorities decide that the time has arrived for the second stage of training: intense indoctrination. Although entrance into this stage may be gradual, it is usually marked by an important change in the day-to-day routine. The physical work is cut to a minimum, and the number of small and large group meetings is more than doubled. In most cases the small groups now meet three times a day. Physical accommodations and meals are improved. This indicates to the trainees that in return for their diligence and enthusiasm they are being rewarded as they will be when they take their role of active leaders in the new society. The following is the schedule of a typical training day:

- 5:00 A.M. Reveille
- 5:30 A.M. Camp duties and work
- 8:00 A.M. Small group meetings to discuss the morning's work experience
- 9:00 A.M. Breakfast
- 9:30 A.M. Large group meeting--four lectures per week
- 12:30 P.M. Lunch
- 1:00 P.M. Study period--lecture notes and preparation of afternoon discussion
- 2:30 P.M. Small group discussion
- 5:30 P.M. Supper
- 7:00 P.M. Small group discussion
- 9:30 P.M. Taps

Such a schedule six and sometimes seven days a week guarantees utter mental and physical fatigue at the end of each day. The major subject matter at this stage is basic Marxist theory and its application in China. In general, trainees find themselves memorizing quantities of terms and long passages which have little meaning for them. The discussion groups apply the theoretical material to concrete situations, but this is a process which at first seems to have little meaning. Comprehension comes later. Camp authorities encourage wall newspapers in which members write accounts of their progress and give their "correct" views.

The group struggle meetings, both large and small, are now devoted to writing autobiographies and diaries. The autobiography is an account of each trainee's ideological development. It helps him come to the conviction that all that has gone before was evil, and to decide that peace of mind can come only through wholeheartedly throwing in his lot with the Organization. Each confession or conclusion becomes group property, and eventually the accumulated weight of the confessions already extracted shows the futility of trying to hold back any doubts or thoughts. The meetings become more intense. Having given up so much of his own privacy, each feels justified in making the others in his group do the same. The day-to-day diary serves as a link between the struggle meetings and the sessions devoted to Communist ideology. If a trainee feels sleepy during a lecture, he dare not fail to mention it in his diary, or he will be caught by one of his comrades who wishes to "aid him" to be a more valuable asset to the new society.

During this period the intense strain becomes obvious to all, yet there is no escape. Tension mounts within discussion sessions; tempers are short in living quarters; social competition is keen in all activities. In camp details, for example, the piecework method is used and emulation campaigns are launched.

This is the period in the training when most of the reclassification takes place. Those trainees who have shown themselves to be vigorous and enthusiastic and have abandoned any reservations are sent along for advanced training. Those who are obviously too upset to be valuable members of the Organization are sent elsewhere to undergo longer periods of training through physical labor. Many are never heard of again.

A major subject during the intense period of indoctrination is "current events." Here the regular themes of enemy-friend and inevitable victory are carried over into the national and international political scenes. The dichotomy makes possible a simple portrayal of the complexities of international life. The "democratic camp" led by the Soviet Union versus the "imperialist camp" led by the United States is the chief theme. The student begins to see parallels in the analysis of his own life and problems, those of his country, and those of the world. Eventually he projects onto the world scene the unbeatable "Organization" and its telling victory over every small barrier he erected. His experience confirms for him the validity of the claim that victory on the world scale is inevitable.

The other important part of the period of intense indoctrination is the field trips. The small groups go into the surrounding country under supervision and observe "concrete situations." Back at camp they discuss what they have seen, methods for coping with the problems they uncover, and possibilities for work by the Organization, attempting to apply the theory they have learned. In many cases field experience includes participation in violence against enemies of the state. The trainees are reminded that they will have to compensate for their youth and inexperience by firmness and vigor against the old class enemies, whose ideas are so entrenched they can never be reformed.

At some point, usually after about six months of training, each trainee passes through an emotional crisis. This is the third stage in the process. It may come after participation in a field trip execution or prior to reading a confession before the large group. Or it may come without apparent reason after about three months of the intense indoctrination and high tension. The crisis usually starts with hysteria and sobbing at night, which go on during the small group meeting the next day and are immediately discussed. One former trainee interviewed in Hong Kong in 1952 claims, though probably with some exaggeration, that in his camp almost one-fifth of the trainees went out of control and their minds broke down completely when the crisis was reached. Some ended up babbling maniacs. These were usually taken from the camp immediately.

The crisis usually comes at about the same time for all the members of a small group. Apparently the breakdown of one of the members launches a chain reaction. A few descriptions of the crisis have been published, but the party's methods for handling the situation and what is involved are still not clear. In some cases, of course, it is much more violent than in others. The cynics and those with a sense of humor seem to survive best; those with strong emotions or deep religious or other convictions frequently break first.

Apparently each recruit reaches a stage when his consistent denunciation of his whole past life and value patterns weighs heavily on his conscience. Strong doubts are created by the atmosphere and methods of the camp. He must decide whether to give up his past individuality completely or attempt to retain it by deceiving his fellow group members and the staff. Usually all doubts are resolved, and the trainee gives himself enthusiastically to every task posed by the Organization. Most refugees indicate that after the crisis has been passed the trainees act as if a great weight has been lifted from their shoulders.

The crisis period is also associated with what the Chinese Communists call "tail-cutting." The "tails" are ties with the old society such as family, friends, old values, and so forth. Following the crisis trainees are able to put an end to all these old associations and values. One refugee tells how a trainee who had successfully passed the crisis stage refused to see his mother when she came to

camp, because he knew she would try to win him back with tears. Tears are considered a product of the old society. The good cadre does not give way to such sentimentality.

After the crisis the students of the revolutionary schools are ready for the next stage: final convincing. Life now becomes easier. By this time the trainee is ready to turn wholeheartedly to the doctrine which he has been learning and to the routine of the camp. All former associations and values have melted away or been successfully dismissed from mind. In a search for something solid to grasp he begins to discover the applicability of the Communist terminology.

Up to the period of crisis, most of the Communist jargon was relatively meaningless. It was just a new language to be memorized, played with, and rearranged in patterns. Now he begins to find that it does have some pertinence to his problem. He sees why it was necessary to eliminate his former "bourgeois" social values and cut his ties with the old society. He comes to understand language of violence because his own experiences and crisis have been violent. In place of his feeling of guilt he is now fired with the conviction that he must publicize his newly found security and help others find peace of mind through service in the Organization.

At this period in the training the staff launches many campaigns among the trainees and uses them in the countryside to help with national drives currently in progress. This sort of activity gives body to the doctrine expounded in Mao's On Practice, which all have studied. The convert fills with a new dedication the void left in his life following the crisis. He seizes upon every word of Communist gospel and learns to apply it to his past, which he now has a vested interest in denouncing. He tries to make himself one of the camp models for emulation.

It takes at least another four months of intense work to consolidate the hold on the now willing mind. Some rewards are given for enthusiasm and in appreciation of the conversion of the trainee. Discussions are now channeled into facing problems which will confront the graduates. They are told of the difficult tasks which will have to be undertaken; for example, that their work may involve living and working with the peasants in order to bring them into the planned economy of the new people's democracy. At this time most of the trainees are willing to volunteer for any assignment which may be proposed. All are impressed with the fact that the success of the Organization depends upon their applying to the groups into which they move the same type of training that they have received. But the experience of most of the students has been so intense, so dramatic, and so vital that they now feel the only hope for them and for their society lies in turning to the Organization.

The final stage in the process is assignment. This depends upon the current demands and drives of the regime. At least one-fourth of the graduates are scheduled for further schooling. Others are assigned to different sections of the society as activists, propagandists, party leaders, or planted students. In all cases the first few months of work are carefully supervised, and the process of small group criticism and self-criticism continues throughout active party life.

By the use of these brain-washed cadres, the Chinese Communists carry the general techniques learned in the cadre schools into the whole of the society. Practically all the Chinese population has been or is being organized into small discussion groups led by trained cadres. These discussion groups usually meet three times a week and are organized from people with similar backgrounds and professions. Thus college professors have their small groups, as do the maintenance employees on college campuses. The process of ideological spying and assistance from the group in problems of conformity continues.

The following excerpt from a statement of a grade school teacher indicates how basic to the whole process of controlling the country the techniques of the cadre training can be, and how they are carried over into the mass arena:

During these present studies I came to realize all these defects and got ready to reveal my mentality right to the bottom, but then I became doubtful again and thought nobody would notice if I hid my errors. Wouldn't I be losing a lot of face by telling everything? Once revealed it could not be taken back again. How ridiculous it would look among the whole school, so many people, that I, a person who has received higher education, could still be so backward! Then I thought that

if I let this opportunity pass uselessly, I would not be able to receive further assistance. Just when I was undecided like this, the director of our school saw the outline of my speech (in which I had put down my ideological life) and dispelled my doubts and made me reveal myself courageously in front of my comrades.

After having revealed all my ideological problems, I felt very much lighter. The comrades gave me very valuable suggestions and confirmed me in my resolution to reform myself. I came to realize that the problems were not a question of superficial mistakes, but were a question of maintaining a petty bourgeois standpoint. Without a resolution to change my standpoint and to gain the proletarian standpoint, I cannot attain to the glory of being a people's teacher.

The methods of mutual spying and the attitudes engendered in cadre training have no limits. They penetrate into the innermost privacy of the home and family. In the China of Mao Tse-tung every action is political. The 1 March 1952 issue of New China Women, for example, carried two accounts of how women had prevailed upon their husbands and fathers to make public confessions of past bourgeois sins. One woman writes:

When the San-fan Movement was first launched, I thought that it had nothing much to do with us women, but after I heard the report concerning the significance of the movement and the role of us women in it, I changed my view. I thought of the corrupt acts of my husband Chen Yu-ming, a technician of a certain municipal warehouse, and felt ashamed of them. I felt that I should motivate him to make a confession and to start anew with a clean slate. . . . he was hesitant about making a confession. I sensed his caution, and reasoned with him. . . saying that if he would sincerely repent, the government would be lenient with him. . . . Finally he promised that he would make a confession to his organization on the morrow.

Another woman describes her methods for making her father confess his past sins and concludes:

Father is a happy man after making a clean breast of his problems. He now heads the San-fan study group of his trade association. The government has saved my father and I have done what is beneficial both to the country and the people.

It must not be assumed, however, that psychological mass coercion or the cadre training has met with uniform success. Although in many cases a permanent change has been made in the lives of the trainees, many of them re-evaluate their training after they have had time for reflection following assignment. Some become disillusioned as they see that the Organization operates for its own self-perpetuation rather than for the happiness of the masses. Others are disappointed to find that power has corrupted many of the old cadres who are seemingly above the process of criticism and self-criticism. The individualism of the Chinese peasant represents a hurdle which the party has yet to overcome. The marked shift away from the persuasion of the flush of victory period to increasing emphasis on the compulsion of the police state indicates that the brain-washing process is still far from being completely effective.

Nevertheless, working through the political structure of present-day China, psychological mass coercion has achieved results which justify studying it as a new dimension of political power. In the first place, wherever it has been imposed in the Communist orbit, including China, the outside world has been denied access to the people. The system of mutual spying and the organization of every aspect of life make penetration of the printed word from outside or the existence of organized groups devoted to a democratic way of life practically impossible. Underground resistance is effectively checked. Passive resistance seems the only hope for undermining Communist power.

Secondly, psychological mass coercion makes possible as never before the mobilizing of great numbers of people. Its successful imposition through time promises to change all the values of the society and raise a new generation for whom the subtler shadings of human life are obscured by extremes of hate and love. Throughout the Chinese press today runs the theme that mercy and compassion are concepts of the old society which can have no place in the class struggle.

Finally, psychological mass coercion working through the five-fold chain of command in China has produced a rigid pattern of conformity and unity. The country today is a drab prison for the mind, which discourages any hopes of Chinese originality finding a way out. For maintaining the conformity

the mass media of communication are most important. Every word published bears out the indoctrination of the training and works for uniformity. Warfare and the class struggle are the themes of all literature dealing with any act of the government. The Chinese people are being uniformly conditioned to think in terms of violence. For example, here is how People's China describes the movement to teach the masses the difficult Chinese written language with its thousands of characters: "The 'shock attack' on the characters is carried out with the same spirit and determination, leadership and organizational discipline as if it were a military operation in the style of the People's Liberation Army. To the workers and peasants, learning means fighting the enemy of ignorance--an enemy that has cost them untold suffering in the past. 'If we can capture an enemy who can run,' said one worker student, 'why can't we catch a character which has no legs?'"

Psychological mass coercion is bringing about the dehumanization of Chinese civilization. In China it is perhaps more thorough than Stalin's attack on the human qualities of the Russians. According to Raja Hutheesing, Nehru's brother-in-law, who was a visitor with an Indian "cultural delegation":

. . . New China is dogmatic, harsh and cruel.

I saw this cruelty in the nursery school at Shanghai run by Mme. Sun Yat-sen. There were more than two hundred children between the ages of three to seven. . . . The children put on a show for the guests. In the show, they marched as the People's Liberation Army, their toy guns pointed at "American" planes above. They learned to hate and kill. . . . There was no love for parents or family, and these little children sorely missed it. They clung to the visitors and wanted to be fondled and kissed. Some had tears in their eyes as they were picked up and patted. I knew then what cruelty meant.

. . . There are no friendly faces in New China. . . . now the faces are set and grim. A friend described the crying of Chinese children under the New Democracy as shrieks of anger.

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